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Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter:  
a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus  
 
Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman
*1 
 
Abstract:  
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an 
agent to report another’s behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a 
sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting 
partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the 
latter of future gains and to help his next partner.  We illustrate how a social preference can 
explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. 
JEL classification: C91, D03, D63 
Keywords: costly reporting, experiment, reputation, prisoners’ dilemma, social preference, 
inequity aversion
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1. Introduction  
People face many situations marked by potential benefits of cooperating with others and 
accompanying dangers of being exploited by them. The fact that it is sometimes possible to 
choose interaction partners based on their reputations for cooperativeness and that one might 
accordingly have an incentive to invest in such a reputation, is an oft-noted factor capable of 
incentivizing cooperation.  But what motivates actors to transmit the required reputational 
information?  
 Both sentiment-focused moral philosophers like Adam Smith (1761) and more recent 
evolutionary psychologists argue that human nature, which the latter view as having evolved 
during millennia of small band existence, includes innate dispositions towards cooperation.
1
 
Built-in inclinations that help us to overcome dilemmas of cooperation may include special 
interest in others’ cheating, emotions of anger supporting willingness to expend resources to 
punish cheaters, and emotions of guilt and shame that function as self-punishments when 
indiscretions are not detected.   
 Closer to our topic of information transmission is gossip, said to account for much of 
human social interaction in every known culture (Dunbar, 2004).  A considerable fraction of 
gossip consists of reports of others’ misdeeds.  Feinberg et al. (2012) report evidence that 
“individuals who observe an antisocial act experience negative affect and are compelled to share 
information about the antisocial actor with a potentially vulnerable person,” and that “individuals 
possessing more prosocial orientations are the most motivated to engage in such gossip, even at a 
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 An accessible book-length treatment is provided by Pinker, 2003. Discussions by economists include Bowles and 
Gintis, 2011. See also Gintis et al. (2005) and Wilson (2012).  
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personal cost” (p. 1015).  Such information appears to have a distinct power to grab attention, 
and psychological normalcy includes a desire to avoid being the subject of negative gossip.
2
   
Being the subject of negative reports may also have direct material consequences, if 
others hesitate to interact with individuals known for past reneging or defection. In modern 
economies, individuals can choose where to shop, which plumber to hire, and so forth.  But the 
same mobility that puts potential cooperation partners in competition with each other threatens 
the reputational mechanism if a cost is entailed in spreading the word about an interaction 
partner’s defection.  If one has already decided to leave the untrustworthy partner behind and 
there is no incentive to encourage her to change, how will others learn whom to avoid? If all 
victims care only about own material payoffs, if they cannot profitably exchange the 
information, and if there is any cost associated with conveying it, then there will be no such 
reporting.
3
  However, there may be non-material motivations for the costly reporting of cheating 
or opportunistic behavior.  First, engaging in negative gossip may be a direct source of 
satisfaction, paralleling reports that pleasure centers in the brain are activated when experimental 
subjects punish selfish counterparts in a trust game (de Quervain et al., 2004).  Second, tipping 
others off not to naively cooperate with the miscreant may bring satisfaction not for the act itself 
but thanks to anticipation of the punishment that this may visit on that actor.  The large literature 
showing cooperative subjects’ willingness to spend money to reduce free riders’ earnings in 
voluntary contribution experiments (Falk et al., 2005; Gӓchter and Herrmann, 2009; Chaudhuri, 
2011) suggests that such motives are widespread, and raises the possibility that punitive motives 
                                                          
2
 As Adam Smith (1761) wrote: “Man naturally … dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness.” 
3
 Note that in network theory (see, for example, Jackson and Zenou, 2014), the standard assumption is that while 
creation of links may itself be costly, information travels costlessly among those actors who are linked together, and 
that information is passed along by default whenever two agents are linked and the informed agent is indifferent to 
having transmission occur. We could locate no discussion of behavioral or social preference explanations of 
willingness to incur costs to transmit information, in this literature.  
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might also motivate reporting.  Third, conceivably the victim feels empathy or obligation 
towards others who are in danger of being victimized, and may accordingly try to warn them.   
 Given the importance of reputational mechanisms to solving dilemmas of cooperation 
and the rapid growth of behavioral economics and social preference research using the 
techniques of experimental economics, one might expect the costly reporting of partners’ 
behaviors to be the focus of numerous studies.  Rather than focusing on the decision to engage in 
costly reporting, however, the most closely related papers have focused on the design of 
reputation mechanisms or the effects of information transmission. We address this gap by 
conducting an experiment that investigates both the willingness to pay to report an interaction 
partner’s uncooperativeness, and subjects’ beliefs about how common that willingness is.  Our 
experimental design, which builds on familiar prisoners’ dilemma stage games, allows us to 
isolate the willingness to engage in reporting when a personal monetary payoff is absent, so that 
only desires to punish the individual, to protect her future interaction partner, or to engage in 
information sharing for its own sake (gossip) are potential motives for reporting. We demonstrate 
that reporting is significantly less common when it is costly than when free, but that costly 
reporting does occur often. We show cooperator-defector reporting to be far more common than 
cooperator-cooperator, defector-cooperator, or defector-defector reporting. Indeed, a majority of 
cooperators meeting defectors report them despite its cost and lack of personal benefit, in our 
study.  We identify conditions under which such reporting, and its relative frequency across 
behavior pairings, is consistent with an illustrative model of social preferences, the inequity 
aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
One condition which must be satisfied to make reporting attractive to an inequity averse 
agent, in our setting, is belief that a sufficient share of the population chooses cooperation. 
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Although reporting at positive cost is never rational for strictly selfish agents in our experiment, 
there exist configurations of beliefs such that the same does not apply to cooperating. We 
conduct an incentivized elicitation of beliefs about others’ cooperation and reporting, and with 
the resulting data we calculate which subjects could be rationally choosing or rejecting 
cooperation out of simple payoff maximization, and which choose cooperation (or defection) in 
error or due to a social preference or emotion.  Almost all observed decisions to defect in the 
experiment are explicable by payoff maximization under own beliefs regarding others’ 
cooperation and reporting probabilities.  Rational maximization of own payoff also explains 
many choices to cooperate, but a substantial number of cooperation choices require alternative 
explanation. In addition to social preference analysis, we keep in mind that our data on reporting, 
especially, are compatible with more psychological explanations, and we bring to bear evidence 
on the role of emotions in a final portion of our discussion. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes related 
literature, and Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 provides the theoretical 
predictions and hypotheses under both monetary payoff maximization and our illustrative social 
preference theory. Section 5 reports results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature 
Although many decisions to cooperate are explicable by rational and self-interested 
agents’ believing that others’ actions may be non-standard (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and 
Wilson, 1982), decisions to engage in costly reporting are never compatible with material self-
interest in our set-up. Social preferences and emotions, as discussed for instance by Camerer and 
Loewenstein (2003) and Sobel (2005), may be required to explain such reporting, if present. 
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The literature on the experimental study of costly punishment, beginning with rejections 
in ultimatum game experiments (Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Camerer, 2003) and continuing into 
work on public goods games with  punishment opportunities (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), includes 
numerous attempts to explain actions without material benefit to the actor. Experiments find that 
many subjects incur a cost to punish when there can be no material benefit, and that the threat of 
punishment can reduce or eliminate incentives to free-ride.
4
 One way to understand costly 
punishment in such games is to see punishers as having an aversion to others free-riding or 
defecting while they themselves cooperate. For such individuals, imposing an earnings reduction 
on free riders at a monetary cost to themselves delivers a utility gain that offsets their lowered 
money earnings. While such punishing can be thought of as resulting from a psychological trait 
of negative reciprocity (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1998; Bowles and Gintis, 2004) perhaps 
linked to an emotional state of anger, it might also be rationalized or rendered mathematically 
tractable by a simpler framework of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 
From a structural standpoint, costly reporting and costly punishing represent different 
stages in a possible sequence of actions. To study punishment conditioned on contributions, Fehr 
and Gächter (2000) provided their subjects with accurate, cost free information on the 
contributions of individual team members, but this left unaddressed the question of how such 
information is obtained and shared in practice. Costly reporting or monitoring is a needed 
precursor to costly punishment except where effort-free mutual observability is an automatic by-
product of working together. The motives underlying reporting need not be identical to those for 
punishment, so the decision deserves study in its own right.      
                                                          
4
 For example, Ertan et al. (2009), find that ex post, individual subjects earn more the more they contribute to the 
public good when opportunities to engage in costly punishment are available. Reviews of the literature on 
punishment in voluntary contribution experiments include Gächter and Herrmann (2009) and Chaudhuri (2011). 
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Several scholars have researched costly reporting in the form of online product reviews 
(Dellarocas, 2003). Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) look at the relationship between eBay 
reviews and sales, as well as the prevalence of and motivation behind reviewing. They find 
reviewing to be frequent and suggest that the giving of feedback despite the absence of private 
material gain might be understood as the carrying out of a “quasi-civic duty” or as part of a “high 
courtesy equilibrium.” Gregg and Scott (2006) find that eBay reviews are a major deterrent to 
fraud, helping to reduce asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers. Wang (2010) 
addresses the motivations behind leaving a review, specifically with respect to Yelp, a for-profit 
business review site. He finds strong evidence that social image and reviewer productivity are 
correlated. Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels (2013) study structural issues related to online 
reviews, conducting an experiment that provides evidence that negative reviews in environments 
like eBay can be deterred by the fear of retaliation. 
But while the boom in e-commerce provides much of the impetus for recent studies of 
reputation formation, traditional economic interactions not amenable to the same fixes also 
justify attention to costly reporting. As Abraham, Grimm, Neeẞ, and Seebauer (2016) write, 
“there now exists a huge literature that aims at evaluating and designing reputation mechanisms 
for internet trading” but still “we know surprisingly little about the determinants which allow for 
the formation of reputation in economic systems.” Like those authors, our main interest is in 
“traditional economic transactions, i.e. in environments where no mechanisms exist that make 
reputational information publicly available.”  
Abraham et al. is one of a few recent papers, including also Gërxhani, Brandts and 
Schram (2013) and Fehr and Sutter (2016), in which costly reporting without clear private 
benefit plays a part in an experiment. Gërxhani, Brandts and Schram (2013) study transmission 
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of information about employee trustworthiness among employers, in one treatment making such 
transmissions anonymous so that direct reciprocity is ruled out as an incentive.  However, their 
players interact in the same condition for twenty periods, which can give rise to incentives for 
“reputation building.”5  Also, their reporting cost is small, partly a by-product of their 
experiment’s multi-period structure, and they do not focus on motivations to report, including 
possibly asymmetric motivations to report “bad actors.” Abraham et al. (2016) compare dyadic 
private information transmission at both zero and positive cost within small populations playing 
a series of 36 trust games. The repeated setting here too contributes to the cost of any single 
reporting action being quite small, and it creates incentives to build cooperation in reporting, 
although reporting is much less common in their experiment when costly than when free. Our 
paper is the first of which we are aware that studies costly reporting in a controlled setting where 
the reporting cost can be appreciable and private material gain is fully ruled out.
6
   
3. Experimental Design  
 Our experiment consists of four main treatments with opportunities to report a 
counterpart’s decision, in three of which reporting is costly.  (An additional costly reporting 
treatment conducted by strategy method is discussed later.)  In each treatment, subjects play two 
one-shot prisoners’ dilemma games, each with different, anonymous, randomly selected 
participants. The payoff structures of the first and second games are identical and of equal money 
                                                          
5
 If players believe it to be widely believed that some people are “conditionally cooperative,” then they may find it 
privately beneficial to invest in promoting such beliefs by behaving cooperatively, since this may support a 
“cooperative culture” within the group until “end game” behaviors set in.  See, for example, Palfrey and Prisbrey 
(1997), Healy (2007), and Kamei and Putterman (forthcoming).   
6
 Another study of reporting that effectively rules out private material gain from reporting is Fehr and Sutter (2016). 
Like us, they explicitly relate their findings to the anthropologically observed human propensity to gossip.  Rather 
than fix the cost, they study willingness to pay to pass on a report, and find considerable willingness to spend 
amounts averaging about 0.3 Euro, or about 18% of what the third party earns in a period if not sending a message. 
But unlike in our experiment their costly reporters are third parties rather than parties to the exchanges. Whereas the 
third party feature is what accounts for absence of material benefit to the reporter, in Fehr and Sutter, it is limited 
repetition and perfect stranger matching that has this effect in our design.  
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value to end-of-session earnings. The payoff table of each round in U.S. dollars is summarized in 
FIGURE 1.
7
 
A key feature of our design is that subjects decide whether to play the cooperate (denoted 
X) or the defect (denoted Y) option in both games at the outset. Thus, in the instructions read by 
the participants, we write XX (YY) to represent the cooperate (defect) option, duplicating the 
letter choice to indicate its play in two games.  In what follows (but not in the subject 
instructions, which avoid such terms) we refer to a subject who chooses XX (YY) as a 
cooperator (defector), or occasionally XX- (YY-) chooser. Committing subjects at the outset to a 
single choice captures the notion that people have tendencies that they carry from interaction to 
interaction. Adoption of this feature simplifies both analysis and reporting decisions, since it 
means that reporting, e.g., a defector, can be a reliable warning about the kind of agent the next 
partner will encounter.  Of course, we need to take into consideration that imposition of this rule 
affects players’ strategic calculations.  Accordingly, pre-commitment for two rounds of play 
should not be misconstrued as being a mechanism to force type revelation in the sense of the 
theoretical literature. Indeed, we will show shortly that under some beliefs, it becomes rational 
for a strictly self-interested agent to select XX (cooperate). 
After being randomly matched with a counterpart, selecting between the two options, and 
being informed of the outcome of their first round interaction, each player in the reporting 
treatments decides whether to report the decision of her first counterpart.  If a player is reported, 
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 Payoffs were quoted in dollars; no “lab currency” was used. While predictions for the PD game are the same over a 
wide range of payoff configurations, the degree of “temptation” to defect, “fear” of being defected on, and the 
potential to gain from mutual cooperation relative to mutual defection, are impacted by the specific payoff structure, 
so that conclusions from an experiment with one payoff configuration may not extend, behaviorally, to alternative 
payoffs.  See, for instance, Ahn et. al (2001), and Charness et al. (2016). We made both the “temptation” and the 
“fear” small because we anticipated that predictions about the share of cooperators, and actual inclinations to 
cooperate, would thus be larger, in turn increasing reporting of defectors. 
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then the second-period counterpart of the reported player is told what that player chose in the 
first round
8
 and is given the option to change his initial choice of X or Y taking into account the 
report he received—this being the sole exception to the rule that an initial choice is binding for 
two rounds of play. Subjects know that they will certainly not play the game a second time with 
the same counterpart, so reporting in the hope that one might oneself be the beneficiary of the 
information is ruled out. The counterpart will also be told whether she was reported on by her 
initial partner, which determines whether the player whose initial choice was reported to her is in 
a position to select a new action.
9
  For example, consider two players, A and B. Suppose that 
both A and B are paired with other randomly assigned partners (not each other) in the first game. 
Suppose also that A chooses XX (cooperate) and B chooses YY (defect). Now imagine that B’s 
first round partner decides to report her (B’s) decision to B’s second interaction partner, namely 
A. Since B was reported, A has a chance to change his initial choice from X to Y so as to avoid 
being exploited by B. A is also free to stick to the choice of X. Suppose, finally, that A (the 
cooperator) is not reported by his initial partner. A is thus informed that B has no opportunity to 
change her choice, so A knows with certainty that B is playing Y in his interaction with her. In 
this example, A knows that switching to Y will protect him with certainty and that the choice 
would carry no danger of foregoing a mutual cooperation payoff.   
As another example, consider a cooperator (XX-chooser) C who learns that her second 
counterpart D had selected XX and has no opportunity to change his decision (C’s initial 
counterpart did not report C’s choice). C may wish to switch to Y to exploit D, but might decide 
                                                          
8
 That is, the computer delivers a truthful report. The potential issues of deciding whether to report truthfully and 
whether to believe a report that has been received are thus eliminated as concerns. We discuss the impact of this 
simplifying element in the conclusion. 
9
 To preserve maximum anonymity among the subjects in the experiment, those who had no opportunity to change 
their own choice were asked to answer a trivia question bearing no relation to the experiment, to keep number of 
computer clicks consistent across all those in the lab.  
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to stick with X in order to avoid feeling guilty, experiencing disutility from advantageous 
inequality, etc. In the otherwise similar situation in which D can change his choice, C would 
have that information and would need to factor in her belief about the likelihood of D changing 
to Y (which may in turn be influenced by D’s belief about the likelihood of C switching).10 To 
check sensitivity of reporting to its cost, we vary it across treatments. A reporting cost of $1, 
$0.50, $0.05, and $0 is present in the High Cost (HC), Medium Cost (MC), Low Cost (LC) and 
No Cost (NC) treatments, respectively.
11
  
Subjects are also asked, after their own choice of XX or YY, for their beliefs about the 
percentage of their peers choosing XX, and —after their reporting decisions—for their beliefs 
about the percentages of defectors and of cooperators who will be reported. The elicited beliefs 
extend our ability to explore possible motivations behind subjects’ decisions. So as not to raise 
its salience too much, we do not tell subjects about the presence of the belief elicitation tasks 
before they make the corresponding choices. Subjects are asked for their expectations regarding 
behaviors of other participants only (themselves not included), to avoid hedging. Eliciting beliefs 
is incentivized by offering a $1 bonus payment for guesses that are within 5 percentage points of 
the actual percentage. At the end of their session, subjects are also asked about emotions 
potentially affecting their reporting decisions: (i) their level of anger toward their initial partners 
and (ii) their feelings of obligation to help the third party in the second round via reporting.  
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 While our design is one of finite repetition, we view the question addressed—that of lack of monetary incentive to 
engage in costly reporting—as relevant also to a world of indefinitely repeated interactions, since agents in such 
environments may also periodically need to seek new interaction partners and may avoid dealing again with an 
individual found to be opportunistic, but have no selfish material motive for incurring a cost to convey the 
information to others, especially when interacting in a population so large that inducing reciprocal reporting from 
others is not a plausible motive. Having only two interactions makes practical relatively large stakes in the lab for 
each interaction, while the fact that the report affects only one future interaction makes the motivational problem 
more challenging by limiting the punishment that reporting can inflict.  
11
 We suspected that a cost of $1 would suffice to deter many from reporting in the context of an experiment with 
expected total earnings in the neighborhood of $15 to $25, thought we might see more reporting with that cost 
halved, and we included the much lower cost $0.05 in case substantial reporting were forthcoming only at a more 
trivial cost. We included zero cost to observe the inclination to report when cost is not a factor.  
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4. Theoretical Predictions without and with Social Preferences 
 Although our main focus is on costly reporting, we discuss here predictions of subject 
decisions with regard to both the cooperating and reporting decision, since each may be 
conditioned by beliefs about the other. We begin with the extreme assumption of strictly selfish 
preferences, rationality, and common knowledge (SRC), then relax the common knowledge 
assumption to allow for beliefs that some may be otherwise motivated, and finally relax the 
selfish preference assumption to allow that the decision-maker herself may have a social 
preference capable of explaining actual costly reporting and some decisions to cooperate 
contrary to material self-interest. We leave consideration of emotional factors to be discussed 
when we view the experimental results. 
4.1 Common knowledge of rationality and self-interest  
The standard theory predictions in the experiment (with SRC) are straightforward. In the 
HC, MC and LC treatments, it is never payoff-enhancing to report, since reporting is costly and 
players are never matched with the same partner twice. Even if there were to be reporting, which 
subjects could randomly choose to do in the NC treatment, YY would remain the predicted first 
choice and Y the free second choice of those receiving reports, thus having no impact on how the 
PD games themselves are played.  
Hypotheses with Self-Interest, Rationality and Common Knowledge (H-SRC): 
In the HC, MC and LC treatments, each subject chooses not to pay to report choices of her first 
interaction partner, while reporting occurs randomly in the NC treatment. Subjects in all 
treatments choose YY (defect). A subject having the opportunity to make a free second choice 
(which, by the above, occurs only in the NC treatment) always selects Y. 
13 
 
4.2 Dropping common knowledge   
Even if a subject is strictly self-interested and rational, belief that others might behave 
pro-socially and/or that others believe such types exist can lead to a different choice over XX vs. 
YY. Let ai be the fraction of subjects that i believes will cooperate (select XX), bi the fraction 
she believes will report a cooperating counterpart, and ci the fraction she believes will report a 
defecting one (0 ≤ ai, bi, ci ≤ 1). We solve for the conditions under which i selects XX or YY 
under assumptions representing two ends of a continuum of beliefs i might have about free 2
nd
 
game choices; we call the two beliefs “pessimistic” and “optimistic,” respectively. If pessimistic, 
i assumes that an individual free to revise her second choice always selects Y, in line with self-
interest, whereas if optimistic, i assumes that cooperatively-oriented participants (XX-choosers) 
will stick with X given an opportunity to make a fresh choice, provided that they are informed 
that they are meeting another subject who chose XX.
12
  
As shown in Appendix A.1, under the pessimistic 2
nd
 game belief, we obtain: 
 selfish player i cooperates (defects) if 5ai(ci − bi) + ci > 2 (< 2) (1) 
By contrast, under the optimistic 2
nd
 game belief, as shown in Appendix A.2, we obtain: 
 selfish player i cooperates (defects) if 5aici + aibi + ci > 2 (< 2) (1’) 
A higher fraction of subjects chooses to cooperate based on criterion (1’) compared with 
criterion (1).  
Hypotheses allowing for Belief in Social Preferences among Others (H-SPO): 
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 Clearly the “optimistic” assumption is strong in that it eschews distinctions based on whether the XX-chooser 
being met with can also change her choice. Its optimism is nonetheless bounded in that YY-choosers free to revise 
their second choice are still assumed always to stick to Y. Our data show that some (but not all) cooperators stick to 
cooperation when having the report of meeting a cooperator, but no defector switches to cooperation in this 
situation.  
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If i is a material payoff maximizer, but believes that others might cooperate and pay to report 
(cooperators, defectors) with probabilities ai, bi, and ci ≥ 0, then i will never pay to report her 
first interaction partner, and will randomly report or not report if reporting is cost free. Subject i 
will choose cooperation (defection) if 5ai(ci − bi) + ci > 2 (< 2), assuming that i has “pessimistic” 
beliefs about cooperators’ free 2nd choices, and will choose cooperation (defection) if 5aici + aibi 
+ ci > 2 (< 2), assuming that i has “optimistic” beliefs about those choices. i will always choose 
Y if able to make a free 2
nd
 choice.
13
   
4.3 Social preferences and decisions to report 
Unlike cooperating, costly reporting can never be optimal for an agent aiming to 
maximize own monetary payoff. Explaining its occurrence thus requires error, emotion, or non-
traditional elements in the utility function. We illustrate how the latter can work if the potential 
reporter i has the inequity-averse preferences proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999): 
 ui(𝜋𝑖| 𝜋𝑗) = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖, 0} −  𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑖 −  𝜋𝑗 , 0}, (2) 
where 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0, meaning that aversion to inequality that is unfavorable to the decision-maker 
(reflected in weight αi) is at least as strong as that to favorable inequality (reflected in weight βi), 
and that the decision-maker never values the latter (“aheadness”) for its own sake (βi takes no 
negative values). Also assume that βi < 1. There are four possible situations under which 
reporting might occur: 
Case 1: subject i cooperates and learns that her counterpart has also cooperated. 
Case 2: subject i cooperates and learns that her counterpart has defected. 
Case 3: subject i defects and learns that her counterpart has cooperated. 
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 Note that by writing conditions (1) and (1’) with strict inequalities, we assume that subjects whose beliefs render 
them rationally indifferent between XX and YY will select the latter, if strictly self-interested. This means that when 
analyzing our experiment results in section 5, we place the few cases in which (1) or (1’) hold with exact equality in 
the set of observations for which an observed choice of XX requires a social preference explanation.   
15 
 
Case 4: subject i defects and learns that her counterpart has also defected. 
For simplicity, we assume that the only other individual, j, whose payoff πj affects ui if αi (and 
perhaps βi) > 0, is the first interaction partner of decision-maker i, with respect to whom i’s 
decision to engage in reporting is made.
14
 Then it can be shown (details are in Appendices A.4) 
that costly reporting will occur 
       in Case 1 if 6ai > ρ, (α + β)bi – β > 0 and (6ai – ρ) > ρ/[(α + β)bi – β]         (3a) 
 
 in Case 2 if (6ai – ρ) > ρ/α (3b) 
    
in Case 4 if 6ai > ρ, (α + β)ci – β > 0 and (6ai – ρ) > ρ/[(α + β)ci – β]         (3c) 
 
where ρ is the reporting cost.15 The analysis in the Appendix shows that the conditions for Case 2 
and Case 4 hold regardless of whether i applies the pessimistic or the optimistic assumption 
about free 2
nd
 choices, while the condition for Case 1 applies only when i makes the pessimistic 
assumption; if she makes the optimistic assumption instead, i will never pay to report.  As for 
Case 3, the analysis indicates that a defector i will never report a cooperating counterpart if βi < 1, 
as assumed above. Even if some individuals have unusually high β values, the individuals in 
question would be unlikely to be defectors (see section 4.4, below), so costly reporting of 
cooperators by defectors will rarely if ever occur.  
Condition (3b) indicates that the more averse to disadvantageous inequality is the 
cooperator (the higher her αi), the more others she believes to have chosen to cooperate (the 
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 i’s potential concern for j’s next partner, whom i may wish to warn or at least inform of j’s type, is a plausible 
additional concern that we discuss later. The simple Fehr-Schmidt model also abstracts from explicit considerations 
of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Charness and Rabin (2002) and concern for others’ intentions (Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox et al., 2007) as such. Finally, unlike Saito (2013), we assume that 
the decision-maker cares only about ex ante expected differences (see also Brock (2013) and Kamei (forthcoming)).  
15
 i is indifferent between reporting and not reporting if the right hand inequality in each line holds instead with the 
equals operator. 
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higher her ai), and the lower is the reporting cost ρ, the more likely she is to report a defector. 
Aversion to advantageous inequality, β, plays no role in this decision. In addition, the condition 
implies that all inequity-averse cooperators report defectors at zero cost (in the NC treatment), as 
long as ai > 0.  
These conditions suggest that if distributions of types (that is, of α and β values) are no 
different in each case, then the threshold belief ai required for costly reporting is lowest for Case 
2.
16
 In conditions (3a) and (3c), there is also the further implication that costly reporting is 
conditional on the belief that others do it (a cooperator [defector] is more likely to report another 
cooperator [defector] if she has a high belief bi [ci]).  As for relative frequency of reporting in 
Cases 1 and 4, the two conditions show reporting to be more likely in Case 4 than Case 1 if ci > 
bi, an intuitively appealing idea that turns out to be strongly supported by our experimental data. 
Adding to this the finding that reporting is not predicted for any individual making the optimistic 
assumption about free 2
nd
 choices, we arrive at the implication that, assuming sufficient variation 
of belief ai not systematically linked to preference type, costly reporting should be most common 
in the case of cooperators meeting defectors (Case 2), with the cases of defectors meeting 
defectors (Case 4) and cooperators meeting cooperators (Case 1) following in that order. 
Hypotheses on Reporting Decisions with Inequity-Averse Social Preferences (H-R-SP): 
(i) Costly reporting due to inequity averse preferences is most likely in the case of a cooperator 
meeting a defector, followed by the case of a defector meeting a defector, with reporting of 
cooperators by cooperators still less common and that of cooperators by defectors rarely if ever 
occurring; (ii) defectors (cooperators) are more likely to report their defector (cooperator) 
counterpart the greater the share of others they believe report (the greater is their belief ci [bi]); 
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 Notice that α – [(α + β)bi – β] = (α + β)(1 – bi) ≥ 0. α – [(α + β)ci – β] = (α + β)(1 – ci) ≥ 0.   
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(iii) the higher is belief ai, and the lower is reporting cost ρ, the larger the share of individuals 
who will engage in costly reporting.  
4.4 Social preferences, beliefs, and decisions to cooperate 
 Although decisions to cooperate can occur without a social preference, as shown above, 
having a social preference may cause an agent for whom neither (1) nor (1’) holds to nonetheless 
select X (XX). Using again inequity-averse utility function (2) for purposes of illustration, 
assuming beliefs ai, bi and ci, and adopting in turn the pessimistic and optimistic beliefs about 
free 2
nd
 choices, we work out conditions for cooperation in Appendix A.3, and simply 
summarize here the conclusion: 
Hypothesis on Cooperating with Inequity-Averse Social Preferences (H-C-SP): 
A subject i who has inequity-averse preferences will be more likely to choose XX the more others 
she expects to cooperate (the higher her belief ai), the more averse to advantageous inequality 
she is (higher βi), and the less averse to disadvantageous inequality she is (lower αi).  
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Overview of the experiment 
 A total of 172 students (152 in the four main reporting treatments, 20 in the strategy 
method treatment) participated in ten experiment sessions in 2013 and 2014 at the University of 
Michigan.
17
 58.7% of subjects (101) were female. No subject participated in more than one 
session, and the sessions lasted about an hour on average, about half of this time being spent on 
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 Sessions were conducted by Kamei while he was Assistant Professor at Bowling Green State University.  All 
subjects were recruited from the University of Michigan experimental lab’s subject pool using solicitation messages 
via ORSEE (Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments). We aimed to recruit 20 participants to each 
session, but actual numbers varied somewhat due to differing show-up rates, averaging 17.2.  
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reading of instructions and answering comprehension questions. The experiment was 
programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All instructions (for the example of the LC treatment, 
see the Appendix) were neutrally framed, avoiding terms such as “cooperate,” “trust,” etc. 
Subjects had to answer a number of control questions (see the instructions) to confirm their 
understanding of the experiment. Communication between subjects was not permitted. Average 
earnings were $20.84, including a $5 participation fee, with a standard deviation of $4.16.  
 Figure 2 summarizes key subject behaviors and beliefs, with panels (a) (at left), (b) 
(upper right) and (c) lower right displaying cooperation decisions, decisions to report defectors, 
and decisions to report cooperators, respectively. We begin with our main focus, costly reporting. 
A glance at panel (b) makes clear that there was much costly reporting, but overwhelmingly 
reporting of defectors by cooperators, as predicted. Focusing on the left panel of Figure 2(b), we 
see that some 45 to 65% of cooperators who encountered a defector chose to report when costly, 
and that reporting occurred considerably more often (almost 90% report) at cost zero (NC 
treatment) than at positive costs (an overall average of 58.6% report in LC, MC and HC). The 
remainder of this panel and the panel below it, in Figure 2(c), show that there is also some, but 
considerably less, costly reporting of cooperators by cooperators and of defectors by defectors, 
and no costly reporting of cooperators by defectors. Overall, an average of 8.0% of subjects in 
the cooperator-cooperator, defector-cooperator and defector-defector situations choose to report. 
RESULT 1: (a) Costly reporting of defectors by cooperators is common (almost 59% report); (b) 
costly reporting in other cases is significantly less common (overall, 8%); (c) there is 
significantly less reporting at a positive than at a zero cost. These results are consistent with H-
R-SP. 
19 
 
Turning to cooperation decisions and expectations, panel (a) of Figure 2 shows that 
regardless of the presence of reporting costs and their size if present, around 50 to 60% of the 
subjects choose XX in each of the main treatments.
18
 The diamonds and triangles in the same 
panel indicate that cooperators’ average expectation regarding the fraction of others who would 
choose cooperation was significantly higher (around 70%) than that of defectors (around 40%). 
The difference is highly significant (p < 0.001, see Appendix Table B.4). With respect to 
reporting, the right side of panel (b) shows that the average cooperator believed more defectors 
would be reported than did the average defector, a difference significant for LC subjects and in 
all costly reporting treatments pooled (p < 0.001, see Appendix Table B.4).  
The displayed frequencies of cooperation and reporting are clearly inconsistent with H-
SRC, which, based on the assumption of rational selfish individuals with common knowledge, 
predicts neither costly reporting nor cooperation.
19
 We now discuss in more detail the reporting 
decisions, considering in section 5.2 their consistency with the illustrative social preference 
model discussed above, and discussing evidence for a role of emotions in section 5.3. 
5.2 Predicting reporting decisions with inequity-averse preferences 
 In the three treatments in which reporting is costly, 58.6% of cooperators meeting 
defectors, 16.6% of defectors meeting defectors, 8.8% of cooperators meeting cooperators, and 
0% of defectors meeting cooperators, pay the cost to report their counterpart, an ordering of 
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 The fractions of cooperators are not significantly different between any two treatments, according to two-sided, 
two-sample tests of proportions. See Appendix TABLE B.1 panel (C).  
19
 We performed binomial probability tests for the conservative null hypothesis that the probability of choosing XX 
equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a probability of 5%. This hypothesis was rejected in each treatment. We 
also performed binomial probability tests for the conservative null hypothesis that the probability that cooperators 
report the initial choices of their defecting partners equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a probability of 5%. 
This hypothesis was also rejected in each treatment. See Appendix Table B.2. 
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frequencies exactly matching part (i) of H-R-SP.
20
 We use again the Fehr-Schmidt model to 
illustrate the ease or difficulty of predicting reporting choices with a model of social preference. 
Although we can’t identify individual utility function parameters in order to predict which 
subjects will report their counterparts, as an exercise we estimate the proportion who would be 
expected to report based on conditions (3a), (3b), (3c) and self-reported beliefs ai, bi and ci if we 
assume that each subject has the same likelihood of belonging to each of the four preference 
types identified and assigned estimated population proportions by Fehr and Schmidt, in precisely 
those proportions.
21
 These calculations imply that about 68.9% of the cooperators who 
encountered defectors, 13.5% of the cooperators who encountered cooperators, and 14.2% of the 
defectors who encountered defectors would engage in reporting at the costs obtaining in their 
treatments given their beliefs and the prevalence of each type.  These predicted shares are rather 
similar to the shares actually reporting, the similar differences between the high share for Case 2 
reporting and the low shares for Case 1 and Case 4, in estimate and reality, being especially 
remarkable. 
 We can also estimate multivariate regressions to check for patterns consistent with the 
reporting conditions of inequalities (3a) – (3c). In Table B.8 of the Appendix, we show estimates 
of simple linear regressions to predict reporting, where the independent variables are the values 
of the three beliefs and two treatment dummies to control for reporting cost. The regressions for 
Case 1 and Case 4 show partial consistency with conditions (3a) and (3c) in that the belief 
variables bi and ci obtain positive and significant coefficients in their respective estimates. These 
coefficients suggest a sort of “conditional cooperativeness” with respect to reporting: the higher 
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 The percentage of defectors being reported by cooperators is significantly larger than the percentage being 
reported in the other action pairings according to two-sample z-tests of proportions using pooled data of the three 
costly reporting treatments (see Panel B.2 of Appendix TABLE B.1). 
21
 Specifically, Fehr and Schmidt estimate that about 30% of individuals have α = β = 0, about 30% have α = 0.5, β 
= 0.25, 30% have α = 1, β = 0.6, and 10% have α = 4, β = 0.6. See also Table 1 in Fehr and Schmidt (2010).   
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the fraction of others a subject  believes report a player who behaves like her counterpart (one 
who cooperates, in Case 1, one who defects, in Case 4), the more likely that the subject herself 
pays to report. The estimate for Case 2 suggests a similar sort of conditionality: among 
cooperators who meet a defector, those believing that a higher share of defectors are reported are 
themselves more likely to report.
22
  
The estimated coefficients on the expected share cooperating (ai) and on treatment 
dummy variables are insignificant (in one case marginally significant), however, failing to 
support expectations (based on conditions (3a) – (3c)) that frequency of reporting would be 
increasing in ai and decreasing in ρ.
23
  H-R-SP is supported, with respect to the relationship 
between  cost and reporting frequency, insofar as there is far more reporting at a cost of zero than 
at a positive cost, in general, and more reporting at zero cost than at each specific positive cost 
taken individually (see Panels (A) and (B) of Appendix Table B.1).
24
  A finer-scale correlation 
between reporting cost and reporting incidence is also found insofar as subjects’ self-reported 
expectations are ones of greater reporting in treatments with lower reporting cost (Appendix 
Table B.4), but between the different positive costs there is no correlation with actual reporting 
frequency.
25
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 There have been numerous behavioral findings of tendency to perform a pro-social or cooperative act conditional 
on beliefs that others do so, for example Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) for conditional contributing in public 
goods games and Kamei (2014) for conditional costly punishing in public goods games with punishment 
opportunities.    
23
 Failure of belief ai to obtain a significant positive coefficient, whereas ci obtains one, in the regression for the 
Case 2 data, is inconsistent with condition (3b), which implies that ai rather than ci should be significant. The 
estimated coefficient on ai is insignificant even in specifications that exclude bi and ci terms. 
24
 The fact that reporting is far greater at zero cost than at a money cost as low as $0.05 might reflect a ‘mental 
accounting’ distinction between money and time costs, or a peculiarity of the zero cost as discussed, for example, by 
Shampanier et al. (2007). This suggests that there could be a substantial numbers of individuals willing to provide 
online reviews with what they treat psychologically as spare time, but who would be deterred if even a small 
monetary cost were involved.  
25
 We note that insensitivity to reporting cost within the range studied by us is consistent with Fehr and Schmidt’s 
assumptions. Specifically, calculations show that with the frequencies of types (αi, βi settings, see note 29) assumed 
by those authors, little sensitivity to reporting cost is predicted within the range of our treatments. For example, 
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RESULT 2: (i) The percentages of subjects engaging in costly reporting are well predicted using 
Fehr and Schmidt’s estimates of the prevalence and strength of aversion to disadvantageous 
inequality and our subjects’ self-reported beliefs about frequency of cooperation. Specifically, 
costly reporting of defectors by cooperators is by far the most frequent case, with costly 
reporting of cooperators by defectors (predicted to occur rarely if ever) not observed and 
reporting in the remaining two cases relatively infrequent. (ii) Sensitivity of reporting to its cost 
is supported by significantly more reporting at cost 0 than at costs $0.05, $0.50 and $1.00, and 
by close correlation between expectations of others’ reporting and specific reporting cost. 
5.3 Reporting and emotions      
 Whereas social preference models like that of Fehr and Schmidt assume rational 
calculation of utility maximizing choices subject to socially interdependent preferences, 
observed reporting may sometimes have more emotional underpinnings. We turn to evidence 
that emotions played a part in our subjects’ decisions.  
 Our first source of evidence that emotions helped to trigger some of the observed costly 
reporting is an additional treatment that resembles the MC treatment in all respects except that 
rather than having subjects decide whether to report their initial counterpart’s choice after 
learning what that choice was, they are asked to decide in advance whether to send a costly 
report if the participant with whom they are matched turns out to have selected XX, and likewise 
whether to send a report if their counterpart turns out to have selected YY.
26
 Of the 20 subjects 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
calculations predict that 70% of cooperators will report a defector in both treatments LC and MC, with a drop only 
to 66.7% predicted to report defectors in HC. Of course, the insensitivity of reporting frequency to cost in our data 
may be more a quirk of small numbers than a fundamental finding.         
26
 These reporting decisions were taken after each subject had made her own choice between XX and YY and had 
indicated what percentage of others she expected would choose XX. Following the reporting decisions, subjects 
stated their beliefs about others’ reporting decisions under each contingency. To minimize the impact of the 
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that participated in this strategy method session, 11 selected XX, similar to the 50% share in the 
MC treatment. Thanks to the set-up, we got decisions from all 11 about whether they would 
report if meeting a YY-chooser. Only 2 of the 11 (i.e., 18%) chose to pay the required $0.50 to 
report their first counterpart if that person chose YY. In the MC treatment, with the same payoffs 
and cost but a sequential design in which subjects first learned the actual decision of their 
assigned counterpart, there were 9 who chose XX and learned the counterpart had chosen YY, 
and 6 of them chose to engage in costly reporting upon learning of their counterpart’s action, i.e. 
66.7%. A two-sided two-sample z-test of proportions says that the 18% and 66.7% proportions 
are statistically significantly different from each other (p = 0.028). The substantial difference 
suggests that “hot” emotion (Loewenstein, 2000) may have played a role in reporting in our main 
treatments. 
Other evidence for a role of emotions comes from the survey that all subjects in the main 
treatments completed following their decisions.  Subjects were asked—following all decisions, 
so as not to contaminate them—to state how pleased or angry they felt about their first 
counterpart’s decision, and how much (if any) sense of obligation they felt to help their first 
counterpart’s next partner. The answers to the anger question indicate that the greatest amount of 
anger was felt by cooperators who encountered defectors in their first interaction.  Self-reported 
anger is always significantly less for subjects in other pairings—XX meets XX, YY meets XX, 
and YY meets YY.  Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that among the cooperators who encountered 
defectors, average self-reported anger towards the counterpart is significantly higher (p = .04) for 
those who chose to report than for those who did not choose to report.  Thus, the strength of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
expectation elicitation processes, subjects were not informed in advance of the fact that expectations were to be 
elicited, as in our other treatments.  
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anger could have been a factor prompting decisions to report, although the ex post nature of the 
answers gives reason for caution.
27
  
RESULT 3: Indications that emotions played a part in costly reporting consist of (i) a 
significantly smaller share of cooperators choosing to report defectors in a strategy method 
treatment than in the corresponding sequential treatment, and (ii) a significantly higher self-
report of anger towards a defector by reporting than by non-reporting cooperators.   
5.4 Obligation, altruism, and normative motives for reporting 
 The post-decision exit survey is consistent with presence of another potential motive for a 
cooperator to report a defecting counterpart: a desire or sense of obligation to help that 
individual’s next partner (say k) avoid being exploited. Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that more 
than 50% of those actually reporting indicate having felt an obligation to help k, versus less than 
25% of those not reporting.
28
 Self-reported feelings of obligation to help are much smaller in the 
XX-meets-XX, YY-meets-YY and YY-meets-XX cases (see Appendix Figure B.1).  
 Although a social preference model might also attach value to helping k, we did not 
include this motive in our simple illustration using the Fehr-Schmidt model because, with its 
focus on inequalities and inattention to intentions and other sources of deservingness, that model 
predicts reporting to help this third party (the counterpart’s next partner) only under a narrow 
range of cases. An alternative explanation, in which reporting to help k is motivated by belief 
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 The anger variable is a subject’s response to the question: “How did you feel about your first counterpart's 
decision? Please rate on a scale from 1 = very pleased to 7 = very angry.” That many people view defecting against 
a cooperating partner as grossly unfair is suggested by the fact that more than half of unaffected third parties chose 
to incur a cost to punish a unilateral defector in a laboratory experiment by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). 
28
 The obligation to help variable is a subject’s response to the question: “Did you feel a sense of obligation to help 
your first counterpart’s next counterpart by sending a report? Please rate on a scale from 1 = did not feel obligated at 
all, to 7 = felt strongly obligated.”   
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that cooperators not only cooperate but report conditional on others doing the same, is discussed 
in the Appendix and is consistent with Table B.8’s finding that for every 1% increase in the 
proportion of subjects whom i believed would report a YY-chooser, there is an 0.84% increase in 
i’s likelihood of reporting a YY-chooser oneself, consistent with conditional cooperation. 
5.5 What accounts for cooperation and defection? 
Although decisions to engage in costly reporting are our focus, we briefly report here to 
what degree decisions to cooperate or defect are explicable by self-interest given beliefs about 
others’ choices (see Appendix Table B.3 for the details). We also discuss briefly whether the 
Fehr-Schmidt model can account for instances of cooperation that are inconsistent with self-
interest, given beliefs. 
A substantial majority of choices between cooperation and defection—63.8 % with the 
pessimistic 2
nd
 game belief, 79.6% with the optimistic belief—are consistent with self-interested 
rationality. Specifically, assuming each subject’s self-reported beliefs to be those on which she in 
fact conditioned her decision, criterion (1) correctly predicts about 64% of choices between XX 
and YY, and criterion (1’) about 80%, meaning that a selfish rational subject would have chosen 
as the subject in question did in almost two thirds (80%) of cases, if she were pessimistically 
(optimistically) assuming that all free second choices by XX-choosers are Y (X). However, 
while 90% or more of decisions to defect are consistent with self-interest under the pessimistic 
assumption in each treatment, the proportion of XX choices that are consistent with self-interest 
is considerably smaller: 26.1% (43.5%), 31.6% (63.2%), 61.9% (90.5%) and 43.5% (78.3%) of 
cooperators had beliefs making cooperating payoff-maximizing under the pessimistic 
(optimistic) belief in the HC, MC, LC and NC treatments, respectively.  In all, H-SPO is capable 
26 
 
of accounting for many decisions to cooperate, but still leaves either the majority or a substantial 
minority of those decisions unexplained, depending what the subject was assuming about others’ 
2
nd
 game choices. 
Can the latter decisions to cooperate be explained by a simple social preference, e.g. the 
one used illustratively by us? Leaving details to the Appendix, we find that only a small fraction 
of the cooperators whose stated beliefs failed to selfishly dictate cooperation under even the 
optimistic assumption—specifically, about 12%—would have chosen to cooperate out of 
inequity averse utility maximization given the frequencies of α and β values assumed by Fehr 
and Schmidt (2010).  Many of the remaining cooperation choices can be explained by aversion to 
advantageous inequality, but the majority of these cases are consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt 
model only at degrees of aversion to advantageous relative to disadvantageous inequality that 
exceed the levels assumed in Fehr and Schmidt’s typology. Put differently, the decision-makers 
in question must strongly wish to avoid defecting against a cooperator and be willing to take a 
substantial risk of being defected against, equivalent to having β > α in the Fehr-Schmidt model. 
6. Conclusion 
 Numerous studies have focused on the roles social preferences and emotions may play in 
accounting for decisions favorable to social welfare but lacking benefit to the actor. Surprisingly, 
the potentially costly act of transmitting information has received little attention. A preference- 
or emotion-triggered tendency to report at some cost to oneself could be indispensable to social 
efficiency in situations in which individuals have the option of simply leaving behind 
undesirable interaction partners without incurring the time, effort or cost to warn others about 
them. Inclinations to engage in reporting—perhaps closely related to the anthropological and 
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psychological identification of gossip as a human universal—may be crucial to the viability of 
many reputation-based incentive systems.  
 Our experiment underscores the fact that reputation formation may involve costs to those 
sharing or transmitting the information on which reputational knowledge is based, and it 
illustrates how laboratory experiments can enhance our understanding of the motivations 
relevant to decisions to bear such costs. We simplified the problem by assuming that whatever 
information is transmitted is accurate, and that the recipient knows this to be so with certainty. 
Although the complications introduced when the message transmitted is a free choice of the 
reporter and when the recipient must accordingly decide whether to place trust in it require 
further research, a body of emerging results provides some assurance that most of our findings 
are likely to hold in such an environment as well.
29
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 A recent example is Fonseca and Peters (2015), who find that the preponderance of reports about the 
trustworthiness of trust game players are truthful, and that the availability of such reports raises efficiency. Abraham 
et al. (2015) and Fehr and Sutter (2016) permit false reports but find few, with Abraham et al. stating “ratings 
typically provide a true account” and Fehr and Sutter stating “it turned out that only a small fraction of gossip 
contains wrong information.” In both experiments, subjects appear to act upon reports presuming their truthfulness. 
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FIGURE 1: Payoff Matrix 
  Player 2 
  X Y 
Player 1 
X $10, $10 $4, $11 
Y $11, $4 $5, $5 
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FIGURE 2: Choices of XX or YY, Reporting Decisions, and Beliefs 
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FIGURE 3: Average Anger Level and Average Feeling of Obligation to Help Third Party k 
 
Notes: p-values indicate Mann-Whitney-test results (two-sided). The Anger variable is a subject’s response to the 
following question: “How did you feel about your first counterpart's decision? Please rate on a scale from 1 = very 
pleased to 7 = very angry.” The Obligation variable is a subject’s response to the following question: “Did you feel a 
sense of obligation to help your first counterpart’s next counterpart by sending a report? Please rate on a scale from 
1 = did not feel obligated at all, to 7 = felt strongly obligated.”  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Analysis 
A.1. Deriving Condition (1)  
Under the “pessimistic” assumption, decision-maker i assumes that an individual free to 
revise her second choice always selects Y.  As shown in TABLE A.1, the combined expected 
payoffs of subject i from cooperating or defecting, respectively, in the two interactions, can then 
be expressed as 
  E[πi(XX)] = 8 + 12ai − 5aibi + ci − aici (= 4 + 6ai + 4 + 6ai − 5aibi + ci − aici)    
and 
   E[πi(YY)] = 10 + 12ai − 6aici (= 5 + 6ai + 5 + 6ai − 6aici). 
Since a selfish player would choose XX (YY) if E[πi(XX)] > (<) E[πi(YY)], we obtain the payoff-
maximization condition:  
 cooperate (defect) if 5ai(ci − bi) + ci > 2 (< 2). (1) 
Player i is indifferent between cooperating and defecting if 5ai(ci − bi) + ci = 2. 
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TABLE A.1: Expected Payoff for Each of Initial Choices (XX or YY)  
(1) Expected Payoffs in the First Interaction 
Own 
Decision 
First Partner’s 
Decision 
Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
XX ai 10 
4 + 6ai 
YY 1 − ai 4 
YY 
XX ai 11 
5 + 6ai 
YY 1 − ai 5 
 
(2) Expected Payoffs in the Second Interaction  
Initial 
Decision 
Second 
Partner’s 
Decision 
Player 
Receiving  
Report 
Outcome Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
 
X 
 
None X, X ai(1−bi)
2
 10 
4 + 6ai − 
5aibi + ci 
− aici 
Only subject Y, X aibi(1−bi) 11 
Only partner X, Y aibi(1−bi) 4 
Both Y, Y aibi
2
 5 
Y 
None X, Y (1−ai)(1−bi)(1−ci) 4 
Only subject Y, Y (1−ai)(1−bi)ci 5 
Only partner X, Y (1−ai)bi(1−ci) 4 
Both Y, Y (1−ai)bici 5 
YY 
 
X 
 
None Y, X ai(1−bi)(1−ci) 11 
5 + 6ai  − 
6aici 
Only subject Y, X aibi(1−ci) 11 
Only partner Y, Y ai(1−bi)ci 5 
Both Y, Y aibici 5 
Y 
None 
Y, Y 1 − ai 5 
Only subject 
Only partner 
Both 
 
Notes: ai indicates the fraction of subjects in the session that subject i believes will select XX. bi indicates the 
fraction of subjects she believes will engage in reporting those who select XX. ci indicates the fraction of subjects 
she believes will engage in reporting those who select YY.  
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A.2. Revising Condition (1) Based on the Optimistic Belief that Cooperators Cooperate with 
Cooperators given Free 2
nd
 Choices 
 Subject i chooses XX if E[πi(XX)] > E[πi(YY)], i.e., 
4 + 6ai + 4 + 6ai + aibi  +  ci − aici > 5 + 6ai + 5 + 6ai − 6aici. 
That is, 5aici + aibi + ci > 2. 
This means the higher is subject i’s belief ai, the more likely subject i is to choose XX. Also, we 
learn that the higher is subject i’s belief ci, the more likely subject i is to choose XX. The 
expected payoffs of subject i in the first interaction are as in Panel (1) of TABLE 1. Those in the 
second interaction are summarized in TABLE A.1 below. 
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TABLE A.2: Revised Expected Material Payoffs in the Second Interaction using optimistic 
assumption about XX-choosers’ free 2nd choices 
 
 
Own 
Initial 
Decision 
Second 
Partner’s 
Decision 
Player 
Receiving 
Report 
Outcome Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
X 
None X, X ai(1−bi)
2
 10 
 
4 + 6ai + 
aibi  + ci − 
aici 
Only subject Y, X aibi(1−bi) 11 
Only partner X, X aibi(1−bi) 10 
Both Y, X aibi
2
 11 
Y 
None X, Y (1−ai)(1−bi)(1−ci) 4 
Only subject Y, Y (1−ai)(1−bi)ci 5 
Only partner X, Y (1−ai)bi(1−ci) 4 
Both Y, Y (1−ai)bici 5 
YY 
X 
None Y, X ai(1−bi)(1−ci) 11 
5 + 6ai  − 
6aici 
Only subject Y, X aibi(1−ci) 11 
Only partner Y, Y ai(1−bi)ci 5 
Both Y, Y aibici 5 
Y 
None 
Y, Y 1 − ai 5 
Only subject 
Only partner 
Both 
 
 
Notes: ai indicates the fraction of subjects in the session that subject i believes will select XX. bi indicates the 
fraction of subjects she believes will engage in reporting those who select XX. ci indicates the fraction of subjects 
she believes will engage in reporting those who select YY. The decision-maker i performing this calculation is self-
interested and hence chooses Y when given a free 2
nd
 choice, but i “optimistically” assumes that others who select 
XX initially will choose X in a free 2
nd
 choice if meeting another XX chooser; that is, all XX-choosers other than 
(possibly) i are assumed to have a social preference or other reason for choosing X in their 2
nd
 interaction, if they 
meet another cooperator.  
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A.3. Conditions under which an Inequity-Averse Subject i Chooses XX. 
If we assume that a subject i is an inequity-averse agent, her payoff matrix is expressed as below: 
Figure: Amended Payoff Matrix incorporating Inequity-Averse Preferences into FIGURE 1 of 
the paper.  
  Subject j 
  X with prob. ai Y with prob. 1 – ai 
Subject i 
X 10 + E[XX], 10 + E[XX] 
4 + E[XX] – αi∙(11 + E[YY] – 4 – E[XX]),  
11+ E[YY]  – βj∙(11 + E[YY] – 4 – E[XX]) 
Y 
11 + E[YY] – βi∙(11 + E[YY] – 4 – E[XX]),  
4 + E[XX] – αj∙(11 + E[YY] – 4 – E[XX])   
5 + E[YY], 5 + E[YY] 
 
Note: The underlined payoffs are the payoffs of subject i. We assume that subject i considers inequality with her 
first-interaction partner (subject j) only. Subject i believes that she meets with a cooperator with a probability ai. 
 
In the payoff matrix, E[XX] (E[YY]) is the expected payoff in the second period when choosing 
XX (YY) based on subject i’s beliefs. Under the assumption of pessimistic beliefs, E[XX] and 
E[YY] are given by Panel (2) of TABLE A.1. Under the assumption of optimistic beliefs, E[XX] 
and E[YY] are given by TABLE A.2.  
The expected payoff of subject i when choosing XX is: 
π(XX) = ai∙(10 + E[XX]) + (1 – ai)∙(4 + E[XX] – αi∙(11 + E[YY] – 4 – E[XX])). 
By contrast, the expected payoff of subject i when choosing YY is: 
π(YY) = ai∙(11 + E[YY] – βi∙(11 + E[YY] – 4 – E[XX])) + (1 – ai)∙(5 + E[YY]). 
Subject i chooses XX (YY) if π(XX) > (<) π(YY). In other words,  
π(XX) – π(YY)  
 = E[XX] – E[YY] – 1 + (7 + E[YY] – E[XX])∙(ai∙βi – αi∙(1 – ai)) > (<) 0. (A1) 
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Case 1: The Pessimistic Beliefs 
From condition (A1) and Panel (2) of TABLE 1, we have: subject i chooses XX (YY) if 
and only if 
 5ai∙(ci – bi) + ci > (<) 2 – (8 – 5ai∙(ci – bi) – ci) ∙(ai∙βi – (1 – ai)∙αi) (A2) 
Case 2: The Optimistic Beliefs 
From condition (A1) and TABLE A.1, we have: subject i chooses XX (YY) if and only if 
 5ai∙ci + aibi + ci > (<) 2 – (8 – 5ai∙ci – aibi – ci)∙(aiβi – (1 – ai)αi) (A3) 
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A.4. Reporting Decisions of an Inequity-Averse Subject 
A.4.1. Case 1 – A cooperator meets another cooperator in period 1 
PROPOSITION A1: Suppose that β < 1. Also suppose that a cooperator i forms the pessimistic 
belief. Then, the cooperator reports (does not report) her matched cooperator if and only if the 
following two conditions hold (do not hold): 
6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌 and −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0. 
Suppose instead that the cooperator forms the optimistic belief. Then, the cooperator never 
reports her matched cooperator. 
Proof: 
Suppose that subject i has been matched with subject j in period 1 and both subjects select XX. Then, subjects i and j 
each receive a payoff of 10 points in that period. We examine the conditions under which cooperator i reports her 
matched cooperator j. We consider the two assumptions on i’s beliefs. 
(a) Suppose that cooperator i forms the pessimistic belief. Under this assumption, from TABLE A.1, i’s total 
expected payoff in the experiment is calculated as: 
 𝜋𝑖(𝑋𝑋) = 14 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖.
2
 (A7) 
By contrast, i’s belief about j’s material payoff is dependent on whether i reports j or not: 
(i) If i reports j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 10 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗 
= 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖(5) + 𝑎𝑖(1 − 𝑏𝑖)(4) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(𝑐𝑖)(5) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(1 − 𝑐𝑖)(4) 
= 4 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
This expected payoff is calculated based on TABLE A.3 below. 
Thus, we have: 
 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 14 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 . (A8) 
  
                                                          
2
 1report = 1 if i reports j; 0 otherwise. ρ=1, 0.5 and 0.05 for the HC, MC and LC treatments, respectively.   
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TABLE A.3: Cooperator i’s Belief about Cooperator j’s Expected Material Payoff in Period 2 if i Reports j 
(Pessimistic Assumption) 
j’s Initial 
Decision 
Second 
Partner’s 
Decision 
Recipient of 
Report 
Outcome Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
X 
Only j’s next partner X,Y ai(1−bi) 4 
4+aibi+ci−
aici 
Both j and j’s next partner Y,Y aibi 5 
Y 
Only j’s next partner X,Y (1−ai)(1−ci) 4 
Both j and j’s next partner Y,Y (1−ai)ci 5 
 
(ii) If i does not report j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 10 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗 = 4 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
This expected payoff in period 2 is calculated based on TABLE A.4 below. 
Thus, we have: 
 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 14 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. (A9) 
 
TABLE A.4: Cooperator i’s Belief about Cooperator j’s Expected Material Payoff in Period 2 if i Does Not Report j 
(Pessimistic Assumption) 
j’s Initial 
Decision 
Second 
Partner’s 
Decision 
Recipient of  
Report 
Outcome Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
X 
None X,X ai(1−bi) 10 
4+6ai+aibi-
aici+ci 
Only j Y,X aibi 11 
Y 
None X,Y (1−ai)(1−ci) 4 
Only j Y, Y (1−ai)ci 5 
 
From equations (A7), (A8) and (A9), we find that if cooperator i reports cooperator j, i’s material payoff (j’s 
material payoff) is bigger if 6𝑎 > 𝜌 (6𝑎 < 𝜌). To see this: 
𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 6(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖) − 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖) 
= (6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝑏𝑖), 
which is positive (negative) if 6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌 (6𝑎𝑖 < 𝜌). 
 
If cooperator i does not report cooperator j, i’s material payoff (j’s material payoff) is bigger if 6𝑎𝑖 < 𝜌 (6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌). 
To see this, 
𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝜌𝑏𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 = (𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖)𝑏𝑖, 
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which is positive (negative) if 6𝑎𝑖 < 𝜌 (6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌). 
In summary, we need to consider the following two possible situations: 
(i) 6𝑎𝑖 < 𝜌 (j’s material payoff is bigger if i reports j; i’s material payoff is bigger if i does not report j) 
(ii) 6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌 (i’s material payoff is bigger if i reports j; j’s material payoff is bigger if i does not report j) 
Suppose first that 6𝑎𝑖 < 𝜌. Then, cooperator i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report is: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 max{𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 14 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(𝜌 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖). 
By contrast, i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses not to report is: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 14 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(𝜌𝑏𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖). 
In other words, i will report j if and only if: 
−𝜌 − 𝛼𝑖(𝜌 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖) > −𝛽𝑖(𝜌𝑏𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖), or 
−𝜌 + [𝛽𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝑏𝑖)](𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖) > 0.  
This condition does not hold as we are assuming that 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 < 1 . This is because:  
the left-hand side = −𝜌 + [𝛽𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝑏𝑖)](𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖) < −𝜌 + [𝛽𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝑏𝑖)](𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖)|𝛼𝑖=0,𝛽𝑖=1 
= −𝜌 + 𝑏𝑖(𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖) 
< −𝜌 + 𝑏𝑖(𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖)|𝑏𝑖=1 = −6𝑎𝑖. 
Suppose instead that 6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌. Then, cooperator i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report 
is calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 14 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖). 
By contrast, i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses not to report is expressed as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 max{𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 14 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖). 
In other words, i will report j if and only if: 
−𝜌 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖) > −𝛼𝑖(6𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖), or 
 −𝜌 + (−𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑏𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0. (A10) 
This suggests that the higher b cooperator i has, the more likely i is to report j. 
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LHS of Condition (A10) 
Condition of b for a cooperator to report 
her matched cooperator, given a and ρ. 
αi = 0, βi = 0 −𝜌  Reporting never happens 
αi = 0.5, βi = 0.25 −𝜌 + (−.25 + .75𝑏𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) bi > 1/3 + (4/3)∙ρ/(6ai – ρ)  
αi = 1, βi = 0.6 −𝜌 + (−.6 + 1.6𝑏𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) bi > 3/8 + (5/8)∙ρ/(6ai – ρ) 
 
(b) Suppose next that cooperator i forms the optimistic belief. Under this assumption, from TABLE A.2, i’s total 
expected payoff is calculated as: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑋𝑋) = 10 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2), 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 =  4 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑋𝑋) = 14 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
Cooperator i’s belief about j’s material payoff depends on whether i reports j or not: 
(a) If i reports j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 10 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗), 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗 =  4 +  6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖  –  𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 . 
Here, the expected payoff of j in period 2 is calculated based on TABLE A.5. 
Thus we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 14 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 +  6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
 
  
bi 
α/(α+β) 
ρ/6 
1 
1 ai 
12 
 
TABLE A.5: Cooperator i’s Belief about Cooperator j’s Expected Material Payoff in Period 2 if i Reports j 
(Optimistic Assumption) 
j’s Initial 
Decision 
Second 
Partner’s 
Decision 
Recipient of 
Report 
Outcome Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
X 
Only j’s next partner X,X ai(1−bi) 10 
4+6ai+ci 
−aici 
Both j and j’s next partner X,X aibi 10 
Y 
Only j’s next partner X,Y (1−ai)(1−ci) 4 
Both j and j’s next partner Y, Y (1−ai)ci 5 
 
(b) If i does not report j: 
𝜋𝑗| 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 10 − 𝜌𝑏 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗), 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗 =  4 +  6𝑎𝑖  +  𝑐𝑖  – 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 . 
        Thus we have: 
𝜋𝑖| 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 14 − 𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 . 
 
TABLE A.6: Cooperator i’s Belief about Cooperator j’s Expected Material Payoff in Period 2 if i Does Not Report j 
(Optimistic Assumption) 
j’s Initial 
Decision 
Second 
Partner’s 
Decision 
Recipient of  
Report 
Outcome Probability Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
XX 
X 
None X,X ai(1−bi) 10 
4+6ai+ci -
aici 
Only j X,X aibi 10 
Y 
None X,Y (1−ai)(1−ci) 4 
Only j Y, Y (1−ai)ci 5 
 
Regarding income inequality between i and j, if i reports j, i’s material payoff is larger than j’s if:  
𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 >  𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, or 
−𝜌 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 >  −𝜌𝑏𝑖 , or 
 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 > 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖). (A11) 
By contrast, if i does not report j, i’s material payoff is bigger than j’s if: 
𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 >  𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, or 
𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 >  −𝜌𝑏𝑖, or 
 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖 > 0. (A12) 
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Condition (A12) always holds unless i’s beliefs (and/or 𝜌) are altogether zero. Thus, we only need to consider two 
cases: 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 > 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖) and 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 < 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖). 
Suppose first that 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 > 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖). Whether i reports j or not, i’s material payoff is bigger than j’s. In this 
situation, cooperator i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report j is: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) | 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 14 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖). 
By contrast, cooperator i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses not to report is: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) | 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 14 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖). 
We see that i does not report j as we are assuming that 𝛽𝑖 < 1. This is because: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗)|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = −𝜌 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌) = 𝜌(𝛽𝑖 − 1) < 0. 
Suppose instead that 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 < 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖). In this situation, cooperator i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when 
i chooses to report j is: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 max{𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 14 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(−𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖). 
Thus, in this case, i reports j if and only if: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗)|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 > 0, or 
−𝜌 − 𝛼𝑖(−𝜌𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖) + 𝛽𝑖(𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖) > 0, or 
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 − (1 + 𝛼𝑖)𝜌 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖) > 0, or 
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)(𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖) > (1 + 𝛼𝑖)𝜌. 
Suppose that 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. Then, this condition implies: 
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)(𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝜌𝑏𝑖) > (1 + 𝛼𝑖)𝜌 > (𝛽𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖)𝜌, 
which means that:  
𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 > 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖). 
This cannot be held as we are assuming that 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 < 𝜌(1 − 𝑏𝑖).  
In other words, cooperator i never reports j if 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1 and i forms the optimistic belief. □ 
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COROLLARY A1: Suppose that βi < 1. Then, subject i engages in more costly reporting in Case 
2 (i chooses XX; and then meets with a defector) than in Case 1.  
Proof:  
As discussed in the manuscript, when a cooperator i meets with a defector j, i reports j if and only if: 
𝑎𝑖 >
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6𝛼𝑖
. 
This condition is obtained by re-arranging Equation (3) of the manuscript. Recall that this condition holds regardless 
of which assumption, pessimistic or optimistic, we impose.  
From Proposition A1, if cooperator i forms the pessimistic belief and meets with another cooperator k, i 
reports k if and only if: 
6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌 and −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0. 
Here, we see that an additional requirement that i will report k is: 𝑏𝑖 >
𝛽𝑖
𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖
; otherwise, −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖 −
𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) ≤ 0. 
The condition of −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0 in Proposition A1 is stronger than 𝑎𝑖 >
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6𝛼𝑖
. To see 
this, re-arranging the condition: −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0, we obtain: 
𝑎𝑖 >
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6[(𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖−𝛽𝑖]
,  
whose right hand side is greater than or equal to: 
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6[(𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖−𝛽𝑖]
|𝑏𝑖=1 =
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6𝛼𝑖
. This means that costly reporting 
is more likely to be realized in Case 2 than in Case 1 under the pessimistic assumption. 
 Suppose instead that cooperator i forms the optimistic belief. Then, when i meets with a cooperator k, i will 
never report k (as shown in Proposition A1), unlike the situation in which i meets with a defector. 
□ 
  
15 
 
A.4.2. Case 2 – A cooperator meets a defector in period 1. 
PROPOSITION A2: Regardless of which belief, either pessimistic or optimistic, a cooperator i 
forms, a cooperator reports (does not report) her matched defector if and only if the following 
condition hold (do not hold): 
– ρ + (6ai – ρ)αi > 0 
Proof: 
Suppose that subject i chose XX and has been matched with subject j who selected YY in period 1. Then, cooperator 
i received a payoff of 4 points in that period; defector j received a payoff of 11 points in that period.  We examine 
the conditions under which cooperator i reports his matched defector j.  
Suppose that subject i has the utility function defined in Eq. (2). Subject i reports subject j if and only if 
ui(𝜋𝑖| 𝜋𝑗)|report > ui(𝜋𝑖| 𝜋𝑗)|not report (i.e., i’s utility when i reports j is greater than i’s utility when i does not report 
j). 
The cooperator i’s totally expected payoff is: 
𝜋𝑖= (Period 1 payoff) − ρ∙1report + (Expected payoff in period 2) 
= 4 + (Expected payoff in period 2) − ρ∙1report.  (A13) 
By contrast, cooperator i’s belief about defector j’s material payoff is dependent on whether i reports j or not: 
(a) When i reports j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑  = (Period 1 payoff) − ρbi + (Expected payoff in period 2 if i reports j) 
= 11 − ρbi + 5 
= 16 − ρbi. (A14) 
(b) When i does not report j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = (Period 1 payoff) − ρ∙bi + (Expected Payoff in period 2 if i does not report j) 
= 11 − ρbi + 11∙ai + 5∙(1− ai)  
= 16 + 6ai  − ρbi. (A15) 
Here, the utility of subject i is calculated using (A13) and (A14) or (A15). 
(i) The utility of cooperator i when reporting defector j: 
 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 4 + (Expected payoff in period 2) – ρ −𝛼𝑖 ∙ [(16 −  𝜌𝑏𝑖) − (4 + (Expected payoff in period 2) −  𝜌)]. 
(ii) The utility of cooperator i when not reporting defector j: 
𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 4 + (Expected payoff in period 2)  −𝛼𝑖 ∙ [(16 +  6𝑎𝑖 −  𝜌 ∙ 𝑏𝑖) − (4 + (Expected payoff in period 2))] 
Here, cooperator i decides to report defector j if 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 > 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡. In other words, 
𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  = − ρ −𝛼𝑖 ∙ [−6𝑎𝑖 − (− 𝜌)] 
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= 6𝛼𝑖 ∙ 𝑎𝑖 −  (1 + 𝛼𝑖) ∙ 𝜌 > 0. 
Thus, we have: 𝛼𝑖 >  
𝜌
6𝑎𝑖−𝜌
.  
Note that this condition is not affected by whether i “optimistically” assumes that a cooperator selects X when 
presented with a free 2
nd
 choice and meeting another cooperator or “pessimistically” assumes that all players select 
Y when presented with a free 2
nd
 choice.  
Reporting Cost (ρ) 𝛼𝑖 
Minimum ai that makes reporting her YY-choosing 
counterpart utility maximizing 
1.0 0.5 0.500 
0.5 0.5 0.250 
0.05 0.5 0.025 
0.00 0.5 0.000 
1.0 1.0 0.333 
0.5 1.0 0.167 
0.05 1.0 0.017 
0.00 0.5 0.000 
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A.4.3. Case 3 – A defector meets a cooperator in period 1 
PROPOSITION A3: Suppose that βi < 1. Then, regardless of which belief (either pessimistic or 
optimistic) a defector i forms, the defector never reports her matched cooperator. 
Proof: 
Suppose that subject i chose YY and has been matched with subject j who selected XX in period 1. Then, defector i 
received a payoff of 11 points in that period; cooperator j received a payoff of 4 points in that period.  We examine 
the conditions under which defector i reports his matched cooperator j. We consider the two assumptions on her 
beliefs. 
(a) Suppose that defector i forms the pessimistic belief. Under this assumption, defector i’s total expected payoff is 
calculated as: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑋𝑋) = 11 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2) 
= 16 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
By contrast, defector i’s belief about cooperator j’s material payoff if is dependent on whether i reports j or not: 
(i) i reports j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 4 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗) 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗 
= 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖(5) + 𝑎𝑖(1 − 𝑏𝑖)(4) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(𝑐𝑖)(5) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(1 − 𝑐𝑖)(4) 
= 4 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖  (See TABLE A.3). 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
 
(ii) i does not report j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 4 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗  𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗) 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗 
= 11(𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖) + 10(𝑎𝑖)(1 − 𝑏𝑖) + 5𝑐𝑖(1 − 𝑎𝑖) + 4(1 − 𝑎𝑖)(1 − 𝑐𝑖) 
= 4 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 (See TABLE A.4). 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 . 
First, we find that defector i’s material payoff is always bigger than cooperator j’s if i reports j. This is because: 
𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − [𝜌(1 − 𝑐𝑖) + 𝑎𝑖(𝑏𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + 𝑐𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖(1 − 𝑐𝑖)] > 0. 
Second, we also find that i’s material payoff is always bigger than j’s if i does not report j. This is because: 
𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − [6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖] 
= 8 − [6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖(1 − 𝜌) − 𝑎𝑖(𝑐𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)] > 0. 
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In other words, regardless of whether i reports j or not, defector i’s material payoff is always bigger than cooperator 
j’s. 
 Defector i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report j is calculated as:  
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 16 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(8 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖). 
By contrast, i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when he chooses not to report j is calculated as:  
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 16 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(8 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖). 
Here, i reports j if and only if: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗)|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 > 0, or 
 𝜌𝛽𝑖 > 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖𝛽𝑖. (A17) 
Condition (A17) does not hold (i.e., a defector would not report a cooperator) as we are assuming that 𝛽𝑖 < 1. 
(b) Suppose that defector i forms the optimistic belief. Then, defector i’s total expected payoff is calculated as: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑋𝑋) = 11 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2) 
= 16 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
Here, the expected payoff of i in period 2 obtained from TABLE A2. 
By contrast, i’s belief about cooperator j’s material payoff may be dependent on whether i reports j or not. 
(i) i reports j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 4 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗) 
where 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗 = 10𝑎𝑖 + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(𝑐𝑖)(5) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(1 − 𝑐𝑖)4 
= 4 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖  (see TABLE A.5). 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
(ii) i does not report j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 4 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗) 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗 
= 10𝑎𝑖 + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(𝑐𝑖)(5) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)(1 − 𝑐𝑖)4 
= 4 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖  (See TABLE A.6). 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
Therefore, we find that the expected payoff of cooperator j is the same, whether i reports j or not. This is because 
even if i reports j, due to optimistic belief, another cooperator will choose the same action if she is matched with j in 
period 2.  
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Defector i’s material payoff is bigger than j’s if i reports j. This is because:  
𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − [𝜌(1 − 𝑐𝑖) + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)𝑐𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖] > 0. 
Likewise, i’s material payoff is bigger than j’s if i does not report j. This is because: 
𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 8 − [(1 − 𝜌)𝑐𝑖 + 5𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖] > 0. 
Defector i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report j is calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 16 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(8 − 𝜌 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖). 
By contrast, defector i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses not to report j is calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 16 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(16 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 8 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖) 
= 16 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽(8 − 5𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖). 
We show that i never reports j as we are assuming that 𝛽𝑖 < 1. To see this,  
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗)|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = −𝜌 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌) = 𝜌(𝛽𝑖 − 1) < 0.  
□ 
 
  
20 
 
A.4.4. Case 4 – A defector meets a defector in period 1 
PROPOSITION A4: Suppose that βi < 1. Then, regardless of which belief, either pessimistic or 
optimistic, a defector i forms, a defector reports (does not report) her matched defector if and 
only if the following two conditions hold (do not hold): 
6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌 and −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0. 
A comparison between the conditions in Propositions A1 and Proposition A4 suggests that 
reporting will be more frequent in Case 4 if ci > bi 
Proof: 
Suppose that subject i has been matched with subject j in period 1 and both subjects select YY. Then, subjects i and j 
each receive a payoff of 5 points in that period. We examine the conditions under which defector i reports his 
matched defector j.  
Defector i’s total expected payoff is calculated as: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑌𝑌) = 5 − 𝜌 ∙ 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2) 
= 10 − 𝜌 1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖. 
Defector i’s belief about j’s material payoff is dependent on whether i reports j or not. 
(i) If i reports j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 5 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗) 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑗 = 5. 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 10 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖. 
(ii) If i does not report j: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 5 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖 + (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗) 
where 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑗  𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑗 = 11𝑎𝑖 + (1 − 𝑎𝑖)5. 
Thus, we have: 
𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 10 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌𝑐𝑖. 
We claim that if i reports j, i’s material payoff is bigger than j’s if 6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌. To see this, 
𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = [−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖(1 − 𝑐𝑖)] − (−𝜌𝑐𝑖) = (6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝑐𝑖) > 0 if and only if 6𝑎 > 𝜌. 
If i does not report j, i’s material payoff is bigger than j’s if 𝜌 > 6𝑎𝑖 . This is because: 
𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖 > 0 if and only if 𝜌 > 6𝑎𝑖. 
Thus, we need to consider the two cases: 6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌 and 6𝑎𝑖 < 𝜌. 
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Suppose that 𝜌 > 6𝑎𝑖 . Then, defector i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report j is 
calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 max{𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 10 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(−𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖). 
By contrast, i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses not to report is calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 10 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖). 
Therefore, i reports j if and only if: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗)|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 > 0, or 
−𝜌 − 𝛼𝑖(−𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖) > −𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖), 
a condition that never holds as this condition can be re-arranged as: 
−𝜌 > (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)(1 − 𝑐𝑖)(𝜌 − 6𝑎𝑖), 
but the right-hand side is non-negative. In other words, i does not report j if 𝜌 > 6𝑎𝑖. 
Suppose instead that 𝜌 < 6𝑎𝑖. Then, defector i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses to report j is 
calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖 max{𝜋𝑖|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑗|𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑, 0} 
= 10 − 𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖). 
By contrast, i’s Fehr-Schmidt expected utility when i chooses not to report j is calculated as: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 max{𝜋𝑗|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝜋𝑖|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 0} 
= 10 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(−𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖).  
Thus, we find: i reports j if and only if: 
𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗) |𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 −  𝑢(𝜋𝑖|𝜋𝑗)|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 > 0, or 
−𝜌 − 𝛽𝑖(−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖 − 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐𝑖) > −𝛼𝑖(−𝜌𝑐𝑖 + 6𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖), or 
−𝜌 − 𝛽𝑖(1 − 𝑐𝑖)(−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖) > −𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖(−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖), or 
−𝜌 + (−𝜌 + 6𝑎𝑖)((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖) > 0. 
This means that only when ci is sufficiently large and also when ai is large enough that 6𝑎𝑖 > 𝜌, a defector reports 
her matched defector. 
□ 
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COROLLARY A4: Suppose that 𝛽𝑖<1. Then, subject i engages in more costly reporting in Case 
4 than in Case 1 if 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 (subject i engages in more costly reporting in Case 1 than in Case 4 if 
𝑏𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖).  
Proof: 
From Proposition A4, an additional requirement that defector i reports another defector j is that: 𝑐𝑖 >
𝛽𝑖
𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖
; 
otherwise, −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) ≤ 0. 
The condition: −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0 in Proposition A4 can be re-arranged to: 
 𝑎𝑖 >
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6[(𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖)𝑐−𝛽𝑖]
.  (A18) 
The right hand side of condition (A18) is less (greater) than 
𝜌
6
+
𝜌
6[(𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖−𝛽𝑖]
 when 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 (𝑏𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖). This means 
that condition (A18) is weaker (stronger) than the condition: −𝜌 + ((𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑏𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(6𝑎𝑖 − 𝜌) > 0 in Proposition 
A1. This means, we observe more (less) costly reporting in Case 4 than in Case 1 if 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 (𝑏𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖). 
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures 
TABLE B.1: Summary of the subjects’ initial choices (XX vs. YY) and reporting decisions 
(A) Decision Data 
                  Treatment by Reporting Cost 
 HC MC LC 
Subtotal 
(Costly 
reporting) 
NC 
Reporting Cost $1.00 $0.50 $0.05 ---- $0.00 
(i) Number of Subjects 
38 
(100%) 
38 
(100%) 
40 
(100%) 
116  
(100%) 
36 
(100%) 
(ii) Number of Cooperators 
(percentage) 
23 
(60.5%) 
19 
(50.0%) 
21 
(52.5%) 
63 
(54.3%) 
23 
(63.9%) 
Number of Cooperators being 
reported [percentage] 
0 
[0.0%] 
1 
[5.3%] 
2 
[9.5%] 
3 
[4.8%] 
12 
[52.2%] 
Number of Cooperators that report 
[percentage] 
6 
[26.1%] 
7 
[36.8%] 
7 
[33.3%] 
20 
[31.7%] 
16 
[69.6%] 
 Number of Cooperators that face 
Cooperators [percentage] 
14 
[60.9%] 
10 
[52.6%] 
10 
[47.6%] 
34 
[54.0%] 
14 
[60.9%] 
Number of Cooperators that report 
Cooperators (percentage of 
reporting) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(10.0%) 
2 
(20.0%) 
3 
(8.8%) 
8 
(57.1%) 
 Number of Cooperators that face 
Defectors [percentage] 
9 
[39.1%] 
9 
[47.4%] 
11 
[52.4%] 
29 
[46.0%] 
9 
[39.1%] 
Number of Cooperators that report 
Defectors (percentage of reporting) 
6 
(66.7%) 
6 
(66.7%) 
5 
(45.5%) 
17 
(58.6%) 
8 
(88.9%) 
(iii) Number of Defectors 
(percentage) 
15 
(39.5%) 
19 
(50.0%) 
19 
(47.5%) 
53 
(45.7%) 
13 
(36.1%) 
Number of Defectors being reported 
[percentage] 
7 
[46.7%] 
8 
[42.1%] 
6 
[31.6%] 
21 
[39.6%] 
11 
[84.6%] 
Number of Defectors that report 
[percentage] 
1 
[6.67%] 
2 
[10.5%] 
1 
[5.26%] 
4 
[7.5%] 
7 
[53.9%] 
 Number of Defectors that face 
Cooperators [percentage] 
9 
[60.0%] 
9 
[47.4%] 
11 
[57.9%] 
29 
[54.7%] 
9 
[69.2%] 
Number of Defectors that report 
Cooperators (percentage of 
reporting) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(44.4%) 
 Number of Defectors that face 
Defectors [percentage] 
6 
[40.0%] 
10 
[52.6%] 
8 
[42.1%] 
24 
[45.3%] 
4 
[30.8%] 
Number of Defectors that report 
Defectors (percentage of reporting) 
1 
(16.7%) 
2 
(20.0%) 
1 
(12.5%) 
4 
(16.7%) 
3 
(72.5%) 
  
24 
 
(B) Tests of equality of percentages of cooperators or defectors being reported, across treatments 
 
B.1. Costly reporting treatments versus no cost (NC) reporting treatment 
 
HC vs. NC 
treatment 
MC vs. NC 
treatment 
LC vs. NC 
treatment 
The three costly 
reporting treatments 
vs. NC treatment 
     
(i) The % of 
Cooperators being 
reported 
.0001*** .0011*** .0024*** .0000*** 
 The % of Cooperators 
being reported by XX 
choosers 
.0008*** .0187** .0688* .0003*** 
 The % of Cooperators 
being reported by YY 
choosers 
.0233** .0233** .0134** .0001*** 
(ii) The % of Defectors 
being reported 
.0366** .0162** .0031*** .0036*** 
 The % of Defectors 
being reported by XX 
choosers 
.2568 .2568 .0428** .0945* 
 The % of Defectors 
being reported by YY 
choosers 
.0651* .0524* .0304** .0126** 
     
 
Notes:  Panel (B) reports two-sample test of proportion results. The numbers are p-values (two-sided).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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B.2. Comparison of reporting frequency by defectors vs. by cooperators, within treatments 
 
HC 
treatment 
MC 
treatment 
LC 
treatment 
Three costly 
reporting 
treatments  
NC 
treatment 
 The % of defectors being reported by XX 
choosers versus the % of defectors being 
reported by YY choosers 
.0572* .0397** .1271 .0019*** .5218 
 The % of defectors being reported by XX 
choosers versus the % of cooperators 
being reported by XX choosers 
.0004*** .0106** .2165 .0000*** .1063 
 The % of defectors being reported by XX 
choosers versus the % of cooperators 
being reported by YY choosers 
.0027*** .0027*** .0110** .0000*** .0455** 
 The % of defectors being reported by YY 
choosers versus the % of cooperators 
being reported by XX choosers 
.1171 .5312 .5312 .3665 .5182 
 The % of defectors being reported by YY 
choosers versus the % of cooperators 
being reported by YY choosers 
.2049 .1561 .2283 .0222** .3077 
 The % of cooperators being reported by 
XX choosers versus the % of cooperators 
being reported by YY choosers 
n.a.
 #1
 .3297 .1189 .1012 .5518 
      
 
Notes:  Panel (B) reports two-sample test of proportion results. The numbers are p-values (two-sided). 
#1
 All subjects 
in these case did not report their counterparts’ decisions. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
(C) Comparison of cooperation frequency across the treatments 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .3561 .4749 .7656 
MC ---- ---- .8253 .2281 
LC ---- ---- ---- .3153 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- 3111 
 
Notes:  Panel (C) reports two-sample test of proportion results. The numbers are p-values (two-sided).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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TABLE B.2: Tests of Prediction H-SRC 
(a) The fraction of cooperators (H-SRC predicts no cooperation) 
 
Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC 
 HC MC LC Subtotal  
p-value 
(two-sided)
1 .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** 
Notes: Binomial probability test results. We adopt the conservative null hypothesis that the probability of choosing 
XX equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a probability of 5%. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. The hypothesis that not more than 5% cooperate is rejected at 
the .01 level in all treatments. 
(b) The fraction of cooperators that report XX-choosing counterparts (H-SRC predicts no 
reporting in HC, MC and LC) 
 
Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC 
 HC MC LC Subtotal  
p-value  
(two-sided)
1 1.000 .401 .086* .241 .000*** 
 Notes: Binomial probability test results. We adopt the conservative null hypothesis that the probability that 
cooperators report the initial choices of their XX-choosing partners equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a 
probability of 5%. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively.  The hypothesis of no reporting apart from error is not rejected in HC and MC and in the costly 
reporting treatments when pooled, and is rejected at the 10% level only in LC treatment.  
(c) The fraction of cooperators that report YY-choosing counterparts (H-SRC predicts no 
reporting in HC, MC and LC) 
 
Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC 
 
HC MC LC Subtotal  
p-value 
(two-sided)
1 .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** 
 Notes: Binomial probability test results. We adopt the conservative null hypothesis that the probability that 
cooperators report the initial choices of their YY-choosing partners equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a 
probability of 5%. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. The prediction of no reporting apart from errors is rejected at the .01 level in all cases.  
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(d) The fraction of defectors that report XX-choosing counterparts (H-SRC predicts no reporting 
in HC, MC and LC) 
 Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC 
 HC MC LC Subtotal  
p-value 
(two-sided)
1 1.000 1.000 1.000 .401 .001*** 
 Notes: Binomial probability test results. We adopt the conservative null hypothesis that the probability that 
defectors report the initial choices of their XX-choosing partners equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a 
probability of 5%. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. The hypothesis of no reporting apart from errors is not rejected in the costly reporting treatments, but a 
hypothesis of no reporting in NC (which is not part of H-SRC as such) would be rejected in the case of NC 
treatment. 
(e) The fraction of defectors that report YY-choosing counterparts (H-SRC predicts no reporting 
in HC, MC and LC) 
 Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC 
 HC MC LC Subtotal  
p-value 
(two-sided)
1 .265 .086* .337 .0298** .000*** 
 Notes: Binomial probability test results. We adopt the conservative null hypothesis that the probability that 
defectors report the initial choices of their YY-choosing partners equals 5%, assuming that errors occur with a 
probability of 5%. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively.  The hypothesis that there is no reporting except for errors is rejected at the 5% level for the pooled 
costly reporting treatments, but at the 10% level only for the MC treatment taken alone.  A hypothesis of no costly 
reporting (not part of H-SRC as such) would be rejected in the case of NC treatment.      
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TABLE B.3: Cooperation decisions & predictions assuming payoff maximization and self-reported 
beliefs  
 Treatment by Reporting Cost 
 Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC Total 
 HC MC LC Subtotal 
       
Number of XX-choosers  23 19 21 63 23 86 
(i) Number of subjects for whom LHS  
of (1) > 2
a
  
6 
(15.8%) 
8 
(21.1%) 
13 
(32.5%) 
27 
(23.3%) 
11 
(30.6%) 
38 
(25.0%) 
(i-1) Number of subjects who chose XX: 6 6 13 25 10 35 
Average belief ai for those in (i-1) ─ #1 82.2% 84.5% 78.5% 80.8% 80.5% 80.7% 
(i-2) Subjects who select XX and have LHS of 
(1) > 2
a
 as share of all subjects who select XX 
26.1% 31.6% 61.9% 39.7% 43.5% 40.7% 
(ii) Subjects who select XX and have LHS of (1’) 
> 2
b
 but not LHS of (1) > 2 
4 
(17.4%) 
6 
(31.6%) 
6 
(28.6%) 
16 
(25.4%) 
8 
(34.8%) 
24 
(27.9%) 
(iii) Subjects not in (i-1) or (ii) for whom FS 
model predicts cooperation (based on 
condition (4)) if α = 1, β = 0.6 
4 
(17.4%) 
4 
(21.1%) 
1 
(4.8%) 
9 
(14.3%) 
1 
(4.3%) 
10 
(11.6%) 
(iv) Subjects not in (i-1), (ii) or (iii) for whom FS 
model predicts cooperation (based on 
condition (4)) if α = 1, β = 1 
2 
(8.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(4.8%) 
3 
(4.8%) 
1 
(4.3%) 
4 
(4.7%) 
(v) Same as (iv) except assuming α = 0, β = 1 
 
6 
(26.1%) 
3 
(15.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
9 
(14.3%) 
3 
(13.0%) 
12 
(14.0%) 
(vi) Subject who select XX but not in (i-1) to (v) 
 
1 
(4.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(1.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(1.2%) 
(vii) Number of subjects in (i) who chose YY: 
 
0 
[0.0%] 
2 
[25.0%] 
0 
[0.0%] 
2 
[7.4%] 
1 
[9.1%] 
3 
[7.9%] 
Average belief ai for those in (i-2) n.a. 55.0% n.a. 55.0% 60.0% 56.7% 
Number of YY-choosers  15 19 19 53 13 66 
(viii) Number of subjects for whom LHS  
of (1) < 2 
32 30 26 88 25 113 
(viii-1) Number of subjects who chose XX: 
 
17 
[53.1%] 
13 
[43.3%] 
8 
[30.8%] 
38 
[43.2%] 
13 
[52.0%] 
51 
[45.1%] 
Average belief ai for those in (viii-1) ─ #2 59.9% 69.2% 76.5% 66.6% 66.2% 66.5% 
(viii-2) Number of subjects who chose YY: 15 17 18
c
 50 12 62 
Average belief ai for those in (viii-2) ─ #3 41.5% 38.8% 27.7% 35.6% 23.5% 33.2% 
(viii-3) Subjects selecting YY and having LHS 
of (1) < 2 as share of all subjects who 
choose YY
 
100% 89.5% 94.7% 94.5% 92.3% 94.1% 
Two sample test of proportion
1
       
H0:  % of those who chose YY among (i) = % of 
those who chose XX among (viii) 
.0163** .3459 .0282** .001*** .0150** 0.000*** 
Mann-Whitney tests
1
       
H0:  term (#1) = term (#2) .0676* .0933* .7977 .0141** .0861* .0033*** 
H0:  term (#2) = term (#3) .0850* .0010*** .0005*** .0000*** .0003*** .0000*** 
 
Notes: 
1
 The numbers are p-values (two-sided).  
a
 LHS of (1) > 2 is the condition for cooperation to be payoff maximizing given the individual’s self-reported beliefs and 
assuming those free to choose select defect for second interaction. 
b
 LHS of (1’) > 2 is the condition for cooperation to be payoff maximizing given the individual’s self-reported beliefs and 
assuming that initial cooperators (XX-choosers) free to revise their decision choose to cooperate in second interaction if 
get report that counterpart cooperated.  
29 
 
c
 There was one subject whose LHS of (1) is equal to 2 (with a = 20, b= 0 and c = 100) and who selected YY. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B.4: Average beliefs (ai, bi and ci) and tests for differences, with cooperators and 
defectors distinguished 
 
(i) Average Beliefs  
                Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC 
 HC MC LC Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
      
(i.1) Cooperators 
    
 
[1] Average ai 65.7% 74.0% 77.7% 72.2% 72.4% 
[2] Average bi 21.0% 27.9% 29.7% 26.0% 39.3% 
[3] Average ci 39.8% 52.4% 75.6% 55.5% 75.1% 
 
    
 
(i.2) Defectors 
    
 
[4] Average ai 41.5% 40.5% 27.3% 36.0% 26.3% 
[5] Average bi 32.5% 28.4% 27.2% 29.1% 49.9% 
[6] Average ci 26.1% 35.8% 25.4% 29.3% 67.9% 
       
(ii) Test Results
1 
We tested the difference in the beliefs of cooperators vs. those of defectors, by treatment. A 
significant result means beliefs of cooperators differ significantly from those of defectors. 
      
 HC MC LC 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
NC 
      
[1] = [4] .0174** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
[2] = [5] .1298 .5650 .6930 .4575 .2817 
[3] = [6] .2805 .1610 .0000*** .0001*** .2184 
 
Notes: 
1 
Mann-Whitney test results. The numbers are p-values (two-sided).  The test results comparing beliefs across 
the treatments are found in Appendix TABLE B.5. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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TABLE B.5: Comparison of the subjects’ beliefs across treatments by initial choice (XX or YY) 
(Supplementing TABLE B.4 of this Appendix) 
(1) Belief ai 
We tested the differences in the average belief a between the treatments, for cooperators (panel 
1a) and for defectors (panel 1b). 
(1a) Cooperators 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .3480 .1569 .4276 
MC ---- ---- .7639 .7320 
LC ---- ---- ---- .4778 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- .9415 
NC ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
(1b) Defectors 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .9445 .1386 .1959 
MC ---- ---- .0514* .0766* 
LC ---- ---- ---- .8024 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- .2752 
NC ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes. Two-sided individual-level Mann-Whitney tests. Numbers in panels are p-values.  The insignificant results 
for most cases means that beliefs of cooperators (defectors) about the % that would cooperate do not tend to differ 
across treatments. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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(2) Belief bi 
We tested the differences in the average belief b between the treatments for cooperators (panel 
2a) and defectors (panel 2b). 
 
(2a) Cooperators 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .6938 .4504 .0317** 
MC ---- ---- .7958 .1543 
LC ---- ---- ---- .2830 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- .0513* 
 
(2b) Defectors 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .6745 .3294 .0970* 
MC ---- ---- .5672 .0307** 
LC ---- ---- ---- .0269** 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- .0158** 
 
Notes. Two-sided individual-level Mann-Whitney tests. Numbers in the panels are p-values.  Results indicate that 
defectors especially had higher expectations of share of cooperators that would be reported in the no cost than in the 
various costly reporting treatments. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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(3) Belief ci 
We tested the differences in the average belief c between the treatments for each of the 
cooperators and the YY choosers.  
 
(3a) For cooperators 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .2492 .0005*** .0004*** 
MC ---- ---- .0687* .0334** 
LC ---- ---- ---- .7765 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- .0118** 
 
(3a) For defectors 
 
  Treatment 
  
HC MC LC NC 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
HC ---- .2645 .4634 .0006*** 
MC ---- ---- .1420 .0037*** 
LC ---- ---- ---- .0010*** 
Subtotal 
(HC,MC,LC) 
---- ---- ---- .0001*** 
 
Notes. Two-sided, individual-level Mann-Whitney tests. Numbers in the panels are p-values.   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.   
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TABLE B.6: The Subjects’ Initial Choices of XX or YY and their Three Kinds of Beliefs 
(Supplementing Panel (ii) of TABLE B.4 of this Appendix) 
In this table, we conducted a regression analysis to explore the relationship between the subjects’ 
initial choices and their beliefs, instead of performing non-parametric tests as shown in Panel (ii) 
of TABLE B.5. 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 if a subject choose to play XX; 0 otherwise 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Belief ai (Belief of subject i  
about the fraction of Cooperators  
in his or her session) 
.011*** 
(.0011) 
---- ---- 
.010*** 
(.0011) 
     
Belief bi (Belief of subject i  
about the fraction of Cooperators 
being reported) 
---- 
-.0012 
(.0015) 
---- 
-.0013 
(.0011) 
     
Belief ci (Belief of subject i  
about the fraction of Defectors 
being reported) 
---- ---- 
.0049*** 
(.0011) 
.0020** 
(.00095) 
     
Constant 
-0.054*** 
(.066) 
.60*** 
(.061) 
.32*** 
(.067) 
-.066 
(.077) 
    
 
# of Observation 152 152 152 152 
F 110.73 .65 19.91 39.51 
Prob > F .0000 ..4202 .0000 .0000 
Adjusted R-squared .4209 -.0023 .1113 .4334 
 - -   
 
Notes: Linear regressions. Observations of all reporting treatments (HC, MC, LC and NC) are included in the 
regressions.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B.7:  The Deviation of Prediction H-SPO (Supplementing Appendix TABLE B.3 of this 
manuscript) 
 
Treatment by Reporting Cost 
 Costly Reporting Treatments 
NC Total 
 HC MC LC Subtotal 
       
(i) Number of subjects whose E[πi(XX)] − 
E[πi(YY)] > 0 
6 8 13 27 11 38 
    Number of subjects who chose YY: 
0 
[0.0%] 
2 
[25.0%] 
0 
[0.0%] 
2 
[7.4%] 
1 
[9.1%] 
3 
[7.9%] 
 p-value (two-sided) for binomial 
probability tests to the null that a 
subject commits this error with a 
probability of 5% (i.e., s/he chooses 
YY with a 5% probability even if 
E[πi(XX)] − E[πi(YY)] > 0). 
1.000 .057* 1.000 .394 .431 .438 
(ii) Number of subjects whose E[πi(YY)] 
− E[πi(XX)] > 0 
32 30 26 88 25 113 
    Number of subjects who chose XX: 
17 
[53.1%] 
13 
[43.3%] 
8 
[30.8%] 
38 
[43.2%] 
13 
[52.0%] 
51 
[45.1%] 
 p-value (two-sided) for binomial 
probability tests to the null that a 
subject commits this error with a 
probability of 5% (i.e., s/he chooses 
XX with a 5% probability even if 
E[πi(YY)] − E[πi(XX)] > 0). 
.000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** 
       
 
Notes: *** Significant at the 1 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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TABLE B.8: The Determinants of Reporting Decisions in the Costly Reporting Treatments 
    
 
Case 1: 
Cooperators face 
XX choosers 
Case 2: 
Cooperators face 
YY choosers 
Case 4: 
Defectors face 
YY choosers 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
Belief ai [%] .0014 
(.0016) 
.0010 
(.0051) 
-.0037 
(.0041) 
    
Belief bi [%] .0087*** 
(.0013) 
-.00047 
(.0035) 
-.0039 
(.0039) 
    
Belief ci [%] .00015 
(.0011) 
.0084*** 
(.0029) 
.013** 
(.0047) 
    
    
HC treatment dummy 
{= 1 for HC treatment; 0 
otherwise} 
-.027 
(.092) 
.38 
(.22) 
-.26 
(.22) 
    
MC treatment dummy 
{= 1 for MC treatment; 0 
otherwise} 
-.037 
(.087) 
.38* 
(.21) 
-.21 
(.20) 
    
Constant -.20 -.21 .23 
 (.15) (.50) (.17) 
    
# of Observations 34 29 24 
The number of  
reporting events  
3 17 4 
    
F 10.72 2.16 1.82 
Prob > F .0000 .0943 .1590 
Adjusted R-Squared .5955 .1715 .1518 
    
 
Notes: Linear regressions.  There were no reporting event for Case 3 (Defectors face XX choosers) in the HC, MC 
and LC treatments. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Fig. B.1: Average Anger Level and the Feeling of Obligation to Help a Third Person 
 
Notes: The Anger variable is a subject’s response to the following question: “How did you feel about your first 
counterpart's decision? Please rate on a scale from 1 = very pleased to 7 = very angry.” The Obligation variable is a 
subject’s response to the following question: “Did you feel a sense of obligation to help your first counterpart’s next 
counterpart by sending a report? Please rate on a scale from 1 = did not feel obligated at all, to 7 = felt strongly 
obligated.”  
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Appendix C: Instructions for the LC treatment 
Instructions 
You are participating in a decision-making experiment in which you will earn an amount of 
money that depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants.  
Please switch off your cell phone. During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate 
with other participants. 
In the experiment, you will be engaging in two interactions, each with a different, randomly 
selected, counterpart.  Each interaction has the same basic structure, including the amounts of 
money at stake.  Your decisions are anonymous. You will not be told the identities of either of 
the participants with whom you interact in the experiment, nor will those with whom you interact 
know your identity. Your decisions will be recorded without any identifiers, and thus, the 
experimenters also cannot match your decisions with your name. We can assure you that your 
payoffs will be based only on your own decisions and on the decisions of other actual 
participants in today’s experiment, and that neither a computer program nor members of the 
experiment team will ever be substituted for other participants.  Details will follow after we first 
explain the nature of the interaction. 
 
Basic Feature of Interactions 
In each of two interactions, each of the two participants who are paired for it decides between 
two alternative decisions, called X and Y.  The amount of money that you will earn from the 
interaction depends only on your choice and on the choice of the person you are paired with.   
There are four possibilities:  
(a) If you choose X and your counterpart also chooses X, you earn $10.  
(b) If you choose Y and your counterpart also chooses Y, you earn $5.  
(c) If you choose X and your counterpart chooses Y, you earn $4.  
(d) If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses X, you earn $11.  
 
(Your counterpart has the same earning formula as you.) 
The second interaction is exactly like the first one. In other words, you will be engaging in the 
identical type of interaction twice, each time with a different counterpart.  
A more schematic way of visualizing the possible choices of your counterpart and yourself and 
the payoffs that would result under each possible set of choices is shown in the table on the last 
page of these instructions.  Please review that table and the instructions so far, and raise your 
hand if you have a question before we go on with the instructions. 
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Your first decision: choosing XX or YY  
You will be asked to make your choices, either X or Y, for both your first and your second 
interaction at the outset.  Even though the two interactions are separate and are conducted with 
different counterparts, you are required to make the identical choice for both of them.  In other 
words, you can decide to choose X in both interactions, which we call “XX”, or you can decide 
to choose Y in both interactions, which we call “YY.”  You cannot select “X, then Y” or “Y, 
then X.”   
Your second decision: choosing whether to report your counterpart’s action 
Once you have made your initial choice of either XX or YY, you will be randomly paired with a 
first counterpart and your earnings from your first interaction will be calculated.  (The pairing is 
completely random and cannot be influenced by either your own or your counterpart’s initial 
choice.)  The computer will then inform you of the outcome of your interaction with this first 
randomly assigned counterpart. The screen in question will remind you of your initial decision of 
XX or YY, will tell you about your counterpart’s initial choice of XX or YY, and will indicate 
your and your counterpart’s earnings from the first interaction based on those two sets of 
decisions.   
Following this, and before moving on to the second interaction, you will be asked to decide 
whether you wish to spend five cents ($0.05) of your earnings to reveal your first interaction 
counterpart’s choice to that person’s next interaction counterpart.  If you choose to report your 
first counterpart’s action, then that individual’s choice of XX or YY plus his or her earnings in 
her interaction with you will be made known to his or her partner in the second interaction, 
potentially affecting their earnings in that interaction as explained next. 
Once each participant submits their decision to report or not report the action of their first 
counterpart, the computer will randomly match you with another participant with whom you’ll 
engage in Phase 2.  (There is zero chance that your second counterpart is the same individual 
with whom you interacted the first time.)   
Please consider the instructions so far, and raise your hand if you have a question. 
Second Interaction 
The no report case: 
Your interaction with your second counterpart will proceed exactly like that with your first 
counterpart unless at least one of the two of you, yourself or your new counterpart, has been sent 
a report by the first participant you or he/she interacted with.  Specifically, if neither of you are 
sent a report, neither you nor your counterpart has a new decision to make.  The computer will 
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simply take your initial choice of XX or YY and your counterpart’s initial choice of XX or YY, 
will calculate the appropriate payoffs for that pair of choices, and will credit you with those 
earnings. 
Example: You selected XX, your first counterpart selected YY, your second counterpart selected 
XX, and neither you nor your second counterpart receives a report about first interaction 
behavior by one another’s initial counterparts.  Therefore, neither you nor your second 
counterpart can alter your decisions.  You earn $4 and your first counterpart earns $11 from your 
first interaction.  You earn $10 and your second counterpart earns $10 from your second 
interaction.  Your total earnings are $4 + $10 = $14, which, together with the participation fee of 
$5, gives you earnings of $19.  Your total earnings are $18.95 if you chose to report your 
counterpart’s action and $19.00 if you chose not to report it.   
The case of reporting: 
To restate, new choices are possible in your second interaction only if at least one of the two 
participants in question, yourself or your new counterpart, has received a report about the other’s 
initial action.   
A participant who receives a report has a new decision to make. 
If you receive a report about your second counterpart’s initial action thanks to the decision of 
their original counterpart, you will be told 
 whether your new counterpart had chosen XX or YY 
 what your new counterpart earned in his or her first interaction 
 whether your new counterpart is in a position to make a fresh decision (like you are) or is 
unable to make a fresh decision (i.e., is not in receipt of a report from your own first 
counterpart). 
Regardless of whether only you, or both you and your new counterpart, are able to make a fresh 
decision, your next step is to decide whether to keep to your original choice of X or Y, or to 
change your choice (from X to Y or from Y to X).  If only you can change your choice, then you 
know your counterpart’s decision will be the one he or she made originally, so you can 
determine the consequence of whatever choice you make with certainty.  If both you and your 
counterpart can change your choices, you will be deciding what to do knowing that your 
counterpart is simultaneously making a decision and has information about what your initial 
decision was. 
Example 1: You receive the report that your new counterpart chose YY, earned $11 in his or her 
first interaction, and is unable to make a new decision.  You can choose X for the second 
interaction, in which case you earn $4 and your new counterpart earns $11, or you can choose Y 
for the second interaction, in which case both you and your new counterpart earn $5.  You can 
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choose either X or Y in this second interaction, regardless of whether your original choice was 
XX or YY. 
Example 2: Your choice in your first interaction was XX and you do not receive a report.  Your 
counterpart’s choice was also XX but your counterpart receives a report about your initial 
choice.  You will be told that you have no decision to make and must wait while your 
counterpart and (perhaps) others make their choices.  If your counterpart selects X for the second 
interaction, you both earn $10.  If your counterpart selects Y, you earn $4 and he or she earns 
$11. 
Example 3: Both you and your counterpart receive reports and can therefore make a fresh 
decision of either X or Y for your second interaction.  Knowing one another’s initial choices, you 
each choose either X or Y and earn the payoffs indicated by Table 1. 
Summary 
You will be asked to choose between actions XX or YY that will be taken in consecutive 
interactions with two different, anonymous, randomly chosen counterparts, each time generating 
earnings as shown in Table 1.  After learning the outcome of your first interaction, you’ll have 
the opportunity to report on your first counterpart’s action at a cost to you of five cents.  Second 
interactions proceed without fresh decisions, each individual’s action being automatically the one 
initially chosen, unless the first interaction partner of either you or your new counterpart or both 
paid for reporting.  If you receive a report about your new interaction partner’s initial action and 
earnings, you’ll be able to take a new decision and you’ll also be told whether your new 
interaction partner received a report enabling him or her to take a new decision.  If your new 
counterpart but not you receives a report, you will be informed of this and will simply wait while 
he or she makes their decision, after which the outcome will be reported to you. 
Final details 
Once both interactions are completed and all participants have reviewed their final information 
screens, the main portion of the experiment will be over. At that point, you will be asked to 
answer some questions your answers to which will have no effect on your earnings. Remember 
that neither information about your decisions during the experiment nor your responses to these 
questions can be linked to you as an individual, since your decisions are recorded under a 
random identification number only.  An experimenter will come to you with your payment in a 
closed envelope and you are then free to leave.  No other participant will be told how much you 
earned in the experiment, and no participant will learn the identities of the two other participants 
with whom they were matched during the experiment. 
Note that some further questions may appear on your screen while the decision portion of the 
experiment is in progress.  In some cases, you may have an opportunity to add to your payoff by 
the accuracy of your answers. 
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Comprehension questions 
Before you make your decisions, we want to ask you some questions, which will appear in a 
moment on your computer screen.  We hope that these questions will help you to check your 
understanding of the possible consequences of various choices. Please answer to the best of your 
ability.  Your answers will not affect your earnings from the experiment, they will not prevent 
you from making any choice you wish to in the payoff-determining portion of the experiment, 
and they will have no impact on what participants the computer randomly assigns to interact with 
you. 
(1) In the experiment, you are going to interact with two different participants in sequence. What 
is your first decision in this experiment? 
(i) Choosing X or Y for interactions 1 and 2 from the set XX, XY, YX or YY, where the letter 
on the left (right) is the choice for the first (second) interaction.  [              ] 
(ii) Choosing X or Y for interactions 1 and 2 from among XX or YY only.  [              ] 
(iii) Making a choice of X or Y for the first interaction only.  The choice for the second 
interaction comes later. 
(2) Once every participant in the session has made their initial decision(s), you are given the 
opportunity to spend some amount of your earnings to reveal your first interaction partner’s 
choice.   
   (2a) How much does it cost you to reveal your first interaction partner’s choice?  ___ 
   (2b) Who in particular will find out your first interaction partner’s choice if you decide to 
reveal it? 
          (i) Every participant in the session [ ] 
         (ii) Your first interaction partner’s counterpart in the second interaction [ ] 
(3) Suppose you reach the beginning of the second interaction.  Suppose that you initially chose 
XX and that you are assigned to a counterpart for the second interaction who initially chose YY.  
Please answer the following questions. 
a) Suppose that neither you nor your counterpart receives a report.  What will you earn in the 
second interaction? ______ What will your counterpart earn in the second interaction? 
_______  
b) Suppose, instead, that your new counterpart’s first interaction partner chose to reveal 
information to you, but your own first interaction partner did not choose to reveal 
information to your new counterpart.  You are free to change your choice of X or Y, but 
your counterpart is not free to change his or her choice of X or Y.  What action do you think 
43 
 
that you would choose, knowing that your counterpart’s choice is still Y?  ___  What would 
you earn? ___  What would your counterpart earn? ___ 
 
(4) This question concerns initial decisions and their consequences for both interactions. 
a) What are your total earnings today (including $5 for participation) if you and everyone else 
select XX and no reporting takes place? $___ 
b) What are your total earnings today (including $5 for participation) if you and everyone else 
select YY and no reporting takes place? $____. 
c) Suppose that all participants other than you choose XX.  Given that that is the case, what 
should you choose if you want to earn as much as possible in the experiment as a whole and 
assuming that 
(i) a participant who selects YY will be reported with high likelihood? _________ 
(ii) a participant who selects YY is very unlikely to be reported? _______ 
d) Suppose that all participants other than you choose YY.  Given that that is the case, what 
should you choose if you want to earn as much as possible in the experiment as a whole and 
(i) a participant who selects XX will be reported with high likelihood? _________ 
(ii) a participant who selects XX is very unlikely to be reported? _________ 
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Table 1.  Choices and Earnings from Each Interaction 
 
      If You Choose & Your Counterpart Chooses    You Earn Your Counterpart Earns 
X X $10 $10 
Y Y $5 $5 
X Y $4 $11 
Y X $11 $4 
 
 
 
